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Model(ing) Privacy: Empirical Approaches to Privacy Law &
Governance
By Lindsey Barrett
Privacy can be difficult for people to conceptualize, including for
the policymakers charged with designing, interpreting, and enforcing
privacy law. In both consumer privacy law and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the privacy protections afforded to individuals are
shaped by the ability of governmental decision-makers to assess
privacy preferences, expectations, and behaviors, which they are
rarely in a position to do accurately. While policymakers can have a
hard time understanding the subtle factors influencing privacy
decision-making or parsing seemingly contradictory privacy
incentives, it is an area where new empirical approaches have begun
to excel. Researchers have used empirical techniques like machine
learning, natural language processing, and crowdsourcing to explain
the complexities of privacy decision-making, and to illustrate the
nuances of privacy preferences, expectations, and behaviors that many
opinion surveys often fail to grasp. Recent work has focused on
eliciting privacy norms through crowdsourcing, modeling individual
privacy preferences and expectations using machine learning,
extracting key terms from privacy policies through natural language
processing, and modeling AI assistants based on context and user
preferences to predict (or nudge) future decisions. Modeling privacy
preferences, expectations and behavior can provide judges, regulators,
and legislators with a more accurate and nuanced sense of privacy
norms for future cases and policy discussions. Encouraging the
implementation of proactive privacy tools, such as automated
annotation of privacy policies and nudging assistants, can help bridge
the gap separating user expectations, user behavior, and how both are
understood under existing laws. While the use of this research in
privacy law and policy cannot fundamentally transform the structural
flaws that skew regulators’ perceptions of societal norms, it can at least
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correct the worst of those excesses, and facilitate policy that reflects
how people actually think about privacy in the modern age.
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INTRODUCTION
“The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the
most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized
men.”
- Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting, Olmstead v. United States1
“Your user agreement sucks.”

1

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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- Senator John Kennedy to Mark Zuckerberg, Senate Judiciary
Hearing on Facebook, Social Media, Privacy, and the Use and Abuse
of Data2
People care about privacy for different reasons, and to differing
extents. As the volume of data sets about each of us continues to
proliferate, and the uses of that information continue to evolve, gauging
individual privacy expectations and broader societal norms has become
increasingly challenging. Individuals make privacy decisions that seem
to undermine their stated preferences, even as the risks to the
fundamental interests linked to privacy, such as equality, autonomy,
and intellectual freedom, only continue to grow. Largely to blame for
these apparent contradictions are the ineffective standards that
determine how privacy decision-making, expectations, and preferences
are measured. The regulatory regime governing consumer privacy and
the Fourth Amendment’s protections for privacy from the government
both rest on the idea that judges and policymakers can discern
individual and collective privacy norms, when in reality, they are rarely
able to do so accurately.
Consumer privacy law in the United States is molded around the
idea of privacy as an economic good, where the degree of legal
protection a person receives depends on her control over her
information through notice and choice mechanisms, like app
permissions or privacy policies. The notice and choice model relies on
the idea that informing consumers in convoluted boilerplate of how
their data is collected and used empowers them to make privacy
decisions that reflect their preferences. Under this thinking, any failure
to subsequently make privacy-protective choices indicates either
apathy or a deliberate declaration of a contrary preference. In fact, it is
exceedingly difficult for individuals to make choices that produce the
privacy outcomes they prefer or expect due to cognitive and structural
limitations. Phenomena like decision fatigue, learned helplessness, and
lack of information about collection and tracking all impede
individuals from making the privacy choices that correspond to what
they hope (or believe) will happen to their information.
Many technologies have become so intertwined with daily life
that even individuals with strong privacy preferences or expectations
cannot make choices that suit those preferences. A person might want
to avoid geolocational tracking but need to carry a cell phone to ensure
an elderly parent can get in touch; someone else might wish to avoid
Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018)
https://perma.cc/Y7E3-PN5P.
2
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web tracking but be required to use a school or employer-run Gmail
account. In a memorable example, journalist Julia Angwin documented
her attempts to avoid every form of surveillance she could by using
burner phones whenever possible, abstaining from using any Google
services, relying on a credit card under a fake name when she couldn’t
use cash, and carrying her smartphone in a makeshift Faraday bag to
block the phone from sending or receiving signals.3 She assessed her
diligent efforts to avoid being tracked as “50% successful” – and this
is a tech-savvy investigative journalist, who was solely dedicated to the
task of protecting her privacy.4 Others may have stronger privacy
preferences or expectations repudiated by the actions of others that are
beyond their control. In a recent and infamous example, Facebook
provided the information of 87 million users to the political firm
Cambridge Analytica, which then coordinated with the Trump
campaign to target voters based on that data.5 The firm acquired the
information after just 30,000 users downloaded a quiz app, and
Facebook’s developer guidelines allowed the firm to access the data
from every Facebook friend the quiz app users had. While users
consent to a lot of things when they create a Facebook account, it is
difficult to argue that the 86,970,000 users who did not download the
app themselves expected their information to be used for voter
targeting by a presidential campaign (or even that the 30,000 who did
download the app would expect that result). Data breach after data
breach further demonstrates that while companies may promise to
protect their users’ data in their privacy policy, they consistently fail to
do so.6 Chief Justice Roberts noted in Carpenter v. United States, this
country of 326 million individuals is a country of 396 million cell
phone accounts, and only the few without phones can escape such
“tireless and absolute surveillance.”7
Despite the enormous barriers to making choices that cohere with
an individual’s privacy expectations or preferences, the failure of
individuals to make privacy-protective decisions is repeatedly declared
Jacob Silverman, ‘Dragnet Nation’ Looks at the Hidden Systems that Are Always Looking at
You, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://perma.cc/3J4C-HQUS.
4
Andrew Leonard, Is Privacy Really Dead? Julia Angwin and the Quest to Escape Big Brother,
SALON (Mar. 2, 2014, 9:00 PM), https://perma.cc/UB7Y-GDDH.
5
Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout
Widens, N.Y.T. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebookcambridge-analytica-explained.html.
6
2017 saw a record high of 1,579 breaches, a 44.7% increase from the year before. More than
half of these breaches involved Social Security numbers, with a total of nearly 158 million
exposed. 2017 Annual Data Breach Year-End Review, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR.,
https://perma.cc/Y5C8-TKEQ (last visited July 30, 2018).
7
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , No. 16-402, slip op. at 1, 14 (U.S. June 22, 2018).
3
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to be evidence that people do not care about their privacy, or to the
extent that they do care, they do not care enough. In addition to leaving
individual privacy at the mercy of broken mechanisms, the inefficacy
of notice and choice warps privacy narratives in public policy by
allowing non-privacy-protective behavior to be attributed to a
conscious rejection by the marketplace. This lets a failed system
masquerade as evidence of democratic consensus on permissive
regulation. Motivated analysis of opinion surveys that measure privacy
preferences, expectations, and behavior in an a contextual and leading
manner further bolsters broad claims that most individuals care less
about their privacy than they do about receiving goods and services for
it, and that regulators should respond accordingly.8 In a country where
consumer privacy is considered a good to trade away and where
consumer privacy is constantly juxtaposed against the primacy of
American innovation, strong legal protections are easy to portray as
stilted, counterproductive, and even undemocratic.9 As regulators and
legislators attempt to craft policy that reflects the will of the people
they serve, this hijacked narrative continues to provide support for
privacy governance that fails to protect privacy, including claims that
permissive laws or self-regulation are the result that the public, rather
than industry, truly wants.
In criminal law, the Fourth Amendment at least sets a textual
threshold of a right to privacy. But the enforcement of that right also
depends on a judge’s understanding of what a reasonable expectation
of privacy is,10 and her application of common-law doctrines to new
technological contexts. Here, too, misunderstanding of privacy
preferences, expectations and behaviors leads to weaker protections for
privacy, as a judge’s perception of what a reasonable expectation of
privacy is tends to differ from that of the average person.11
Furthermore, as Justice Alito put it, “judges are apt to confuse their
own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable
person to which the Katz test looks.”12 Demographics may also play a
part. Judges are older, whiter, more likely to be male, and better

8

See, e.g., Association of National Advertisers, Comment Letter on Protecting the Privacy of
Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, at 11 (May 31, 2016),
https://perma.cc/YS3Y-2TVV (hereinafter, ANA Comments).
9
See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO L. J.
115, 132 (2017) (describing the “marketplace discourse” of privacy in the United States).
10
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
11
See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L. J. 727, 732 (1993).
12
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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educated than is the average defendant.13 The judiciary is also more
likely to be aware of technological risks,14 less likely to have had
personal interactions with the criminal justice system,15 and likely to
overestimate the average person’s understanding of how privacy and
surveillance works.16 Whatever the combination of factors, judges tend
to believe that the public holds a lower expectation of privacy than the
public itself reports.17
One example of the space between the judge’s reasonable
expectation of privacy and that of the average person is the recent
landmark privacy case, Carpenter v. United States.18 The Supreme
Court held that the government must obtain a warrant before obtaining
seven or more days of cell site location information (CSLI) from a
third-party service provider, in lieu of extending the third-party
doctrine’s principle that the defendant had assumed the risk (and
extinguished any reasonable expectation of privacy) that law
enforcement might obtain the information by entrusting it to the
company.19 But the logic of the holding depends on both the duration
of the tracking, and the fact that the data collected was geolocational.20
Other kinds of information transmitted through third parties – which,
in the modern age, is nearly all the information we interact with – may
still be accessed without a warrant. While the decision is an important
13

See Bernard Chao, Catherine S. Durso, Ian P. Farrell & Christopher T. Robertson, Why Courts
Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology, 106 CAL. L. REV. 263, 290 (2018)
(noting that the judiciary tends to be more male, white, affluent and educated than ordinary
members of the public); Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 139, 170 (2016).
14
See Tokson, supra note 13, at 169-70 (observing that knowledge about technology tends to
reach more highly educated people, and that judges are both more highly educated than average,
and more likely to be better acquainted with both government surveillance and criminal
procedure).
15
See Chao et al., supra note 13, at 289-291 (discussing the prior literature on how demographics
impact judicial perceptions, noting that the judiciary skews more male, white, educated, and older
than the American population at large, and the relatively high rates of imprisonment and lower
representation on the state and federal bench for African-Americans and Hispanics).
16
Tokson, supra note 13, at 172 (“[J]udges are well-informed socioeconomic elites who are likely
to systematically overestimate societal knowledge. Societal knowledge tends to be
counterintuitively low, and tends to spread more quickly to elites than to the average citizen.”)
(citations omitted). See, e.g., id. at 174 (distinguishing the high level of understanding courts
consider the average person to have of surveillance and web tracking from the average person’s
actual understanding of those technologies, which tends to be limited).
17
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 11, at 731 (describing the evolution of the “societal
understanding” of privacy norms as a function of the Katz test).
18
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , No. 16-402, slip op. at 12-13 (U.S. June 22, 2018).
19
Id. at 11.
20
Id. at 18 (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question
conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other
business records that might incidentally reveal location information.”).
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step towards updating the Fourth Amendment for the digital age, it’s
unlikely this distinction aligns with how most people think about the
sensitivity of their information. In one study, 90% of participants
believed that police should have to at least obtain a warrant before
accessing the email addresses they had corresponded with, whereas
only 55-60% believed that a warrant should be required for their
geolocation information, and few varied in their answer according to
the duration of the geolocation tracking.21 Carpenter’s protection for
information relayed through third parties rests on factors that people
care less about, as opposed to the kinds of information (like email
addresses) left unprotected by the decision.
While Carpenter provided a rare glimmer of hope for those who
wish to see a Fourth Amendment that fully grapples with the breadth
and depth of technological change, most judicial attempts to apply
analog doctrines to digital technology frequently ignore the extent to
which the new context undermines the logic underlying older
doctrines. Areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence like the thirdparty doctrine, the public view doctrine, and the content/non-content
distinction insufficiently consider the role of context in privacy
decision-making, and have been rendered inapt by technological
realities.22 For example, the majority’s declination to extend the thirdparty doctrine to CSLI rested on the particular sensitivity of
geolocation information, given that cellphones accompany their
owners everywhere, in contrast with a car.23 But modern vehicles come
equipped with GPS and the ability to sync with the driver’s phone;
some even receive their connectivity from the same cell towers that
collect CSLI, all while being subject to warrantless access by law
enforcement under the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception.24
The result is a privacy right tethered to the reasonable judge’s
expectation of privacy rather than that of the reasonable person, and
doctrines that fail to provide the Constitutional guarantees of privacy
they were designed to give.
This article does not intend to imply that consumer and criminal
privacy law work in the same way, or are hobbled by identical
deficiencies. The principles, objectives, and constraints of consumer
21

Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require
Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 20, 52-54 (2015).
22
See infra Part II(b)(ii).
23
Carpenter, slip op. at 13.
24
Lindsey Barrett, Herbie, Fully Downloaded: Data-Driven Vehicles and the Automobile
Exception, 106 GEO L. J. 182, 185-187 (2017) (describing the tracking and collection capacities
of connected cars and arguing that the privacy interest in the information they collect merits the
use of a warrant).
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privacy law and Fourth Amendment law are different, as are the
institutional competencies of the governmental decision-makers
creating and applying the law. Consumer privacy regulators must be
able to accurately deduce privacy norms and apply them to legal
standards, as a judge does. But they also use their understanding of
norms to determine the fundamental level of protection consumers will
receive from proactive policy measures, whether through enforcement
actions, regulation, public education, or incentive programs. Correctly
assessing privacy norms in a market-based privacy model is crucial, as
there is no theoretical floor of what protections consumer privacy
should receive. A narrative informed by a mistaken faith in
economically rational privacy decision-making or misleading opinion
surveys can impact how legislators and regulators view their
obligations to the public.
In comparison, privacy in criminal law as guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment does have a fundamental floor, namely the
Constitutional right the Framers provided for privacy.25 But that too is
ensured by a judge’s understanding of societal expectations of privacy,
when their experiences and perspectives rarely reflect those of the
average person. Judges applying the law based on an accurate
understanding of societal privacy norms is a fundamental component
of ensuring that the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectation of
privacy” reflects what the average reasonable person would expect.26
Moreover, consumer privacy and Fourth Amendment privacy have
become increasingly interdependent as the vast amounts of data that
companies collect and store become the vast amounts of evidence the
government can access. The myth of the rational privacy decisionmaker in consumer privacy is also highly relevant to many Fourth
Amendment doctrines.
In both areas of the law, the amount of privacy the law guarantees
depends in large measure on how a person makes privacy decisions,
given the information society expects them to have.27 And while the
failure of notice and choice as an effective data control mechanism
facilitates companies’ ability to collect data that can be accessed by law
enforcement, permissive privacy regulation gives them little reason to
25

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
27
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Carpenter, 585 U.S. ___ (No. 16-402) (2018)
(Alito, J.) (“Well, I mean, that's a debatable empirical point whether people realize [that the cell
phones companies are storing records of their movements], and there's reason to think maybe they
do . . . . The contract, the standard MetroPCS contract seems to … advise the customer that we
can disclose this information to the government if we get a court order. So I don't know whether
that will hold up.”).
26
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restrain themselves. The technologies that are primarily regulated by
consumer law are the instrumentalities of the surveillance the Fourth
Amendment protects against. This article discusses both areas of the
law to highlight those interdependencies and because the research
discussed infra can be a valuable tool for judges and regulators alike in
understanding the privacy norms that they often struggle to accurately
interpret.
Computer science researchers have begun to attack the problem
of understanding privacy norms with research that empirically
measures privacy behavior and preferences, and which more heavily
focuses on the role of context and other non-normative factors on
privacy decision-making, such as by deducing preferences through
modeling user behavior, or by training predictive models on
crowdsourced answers to context-focused privacy vignettes. Empirical
evidence on privacy norms already plays a role in shaping consumer
privacy policy at the agency level, largely through opinion surveys. But
the role of empirical evidence in privacy policy and judicial decisionmaking can be expanded and improved to better measure how people
feel about their privacy, and why. In consumer privacy, where legal
protections hinge on individuals’ control of their information and
regulators’ perception of the norms their actions create, it is crucial to
parse privacy expectations, preferences, and behavior, and to
understand the barriers hindering consumers from making privacy
decisions that reflect their preferences and expectations. Regulators
would benefit from analyzing and incentivizing research that
acknowledges the impact of those barriers and the role of context in
privacy decision-making, particularly in lieu of broadly framed opinion
surveys that ignore the existence of either. In Fourth Amendment law,
the use of empirical research to guide governmental decision-making
is much less common; empirical research on privacy norms could help
correct judges’ erroneous understanding of what a reasonable
expectation of privacy is, and to consider how blunt precedents should
be applied to new technology.
Though deeply flawed, the existing legal standards governing
privacy in the United States are unlikely to change in a fundamental
way anytime soon. The reasonable expectation of privacy test is a
foundational pillar of Fourth Amendment doctrine, and notice and
choice is equally inextricable from consumer privacy law. But as long
as the degree of privacy protection a consumer is afforded depends
primarily on engaging with notice and choice mechanisms, regulators
need to understand how and why privacy decision-making fails to
represent the outcomes consumers intend. As long as the Fourth
Amendment rests on a judge’s perception of societal norms and
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applying analog precedent to technologies that undermine the
principles upon which they were based, judges need a more accurate
understanding of the average person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, and the extent to which technology shifts the applicability of
older precedents to the modern day. A more empirically accurate
approach to how those standards measures privacy norms could help
straighten misguided narratives, restore weakened protections, and
update basic policy assumptions that have grown obsolete.
This article will proceed in five parts. The first part will provide
an overview of consumer and criminal privacy laws and the respective
deficiencies of each that have resulted in misinterpretation of privacy
preferences, expectations, behaviors, and norms by judges and
regulators. The second will address the role of context in privacy
decision-making and in Fourth Amendment doctrine. The third will
provide an overview on relevant empirical privacy research, and
discuss new research that uses machine learning, crowdsourcing, and
natural language processing to provide an empirical basis for
understanding privacy preferences, expectations, behaviors, and
norms, as well as methods of operationalizing user preferences and
expectations to make privacy decision-making more coherent. The
fourth part will address the applications of that research in consumer
and criminal law, recognizing the institutional competences and
limitations of different branches of government in how empirical
evidence may be used. The fifth part will address additional
considerations, and the sixth will conclude.
I.

PRIVACY NORMS & THE LAW

A. Consumer Privacy
As the United States lacks an omnibus privacy law, consumer
privacy is protected through a fractal array of sector-specific statutes at
the state and federal levels.28 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects the privacy of health
information;29 the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)
protects the privacy of genetic information;30 the Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) covers educational information;31
28

See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 14
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 989, 990 nn.1-5 (2012) (detailing sector-specific privacy statutes); Lorrie
Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Notice and Choice, 10
J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 277 (2012).
29
45 C.F.R. § 160 (2017).
30
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5 (2012).
31
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).
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children’s privacy is protected by the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA);32 financial privacy is protected under the
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)33 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA);34 the Privacy Act of 1974 provides protections for
information held by the federal government.35 Other laws, prompted by
sporadic public uproar over individual events, protect varied forms of
information like video rental records under the Video Privacy
Protection Act (VPPA),36 or state driver’s licenses under the Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act (DPPA).37
Each of these is heavily influenced or directly predicated on the
Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), a framework of privacy
governance principles that became the global touchstone of privacy
regulation. First mentioned in a report from the U.S. Department of
Health and Welfare, the FIPPs became more influential after being
formalized in a report from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1980.38 The FIPPs,
particularly the collection limitation principle and the use limitation
principle, emphasize the informational control of the user and spurred
the development of notice and choice as a bedrock privacy safeguard
in privacy law and policy.39 Federal and state privacy statutes allow
different treatment of information based on whether the data-collecting
entity obtains consent.40 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the
United States’ de facto data protection agency, has applied its
deception authority under the FTC Act to privacy policies and promises
by bringing enforcement actions against companies that obtain consent
through a policy that is contrary or silent as to the actual practices of

32

15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012).
34
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
35
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
36
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
37
18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012).
38
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES ON
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980).
39
See Rebecca Balebako, Cristian Bravo-Lillo & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Is Notice Enough:
Mitigating the Risks of Smartphone Data Sharing, 11 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 279,
281-82 (2015) (describing the development of the Fair Information Practice Principles, and noting
that only one, Integrity/Security, focuses solely on the data collector, rather than the information
control of the subject); CHRISTOPHER HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW
AND POLICY 152-53 (2016) (describing the FIPs as the “basis for virtually all information privacy
regulation”).
40
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and The Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1880, 1880 (2013) (“Consent legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of
personal data.”).
33
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the company.41 Notice and choice, particularly through privacy
policies, is broadly understood to be the fundamental basis of the
agency’s privacy philosophy and an integral component of its policy
toolkit.42
The primacy of notice and choice in consumer privacy law makes
individual privacy decision-making the bellwether of privacy
protection in the consumer sphere. How a user understands the privacy
decisions she make, and a regulator’s interpretation of those
motivations is fundamental. The idea that providing an individual with
notice of a company’s practices, and choice over whether or not to use
the service after being provided with information about those practices,
is the foundational safeguard that a data-collecting entity should
provide.43 But while the notion of privacy as informational control is
the foundation establishing consumer privacy law, it is as ineffective
as it would be difficult to replace.44 Critics have long challenged FIPPs
on the basis that notice and choice merely confers an illusion of control,
and that it reduces privacy compliance to check-the-box formalism
with no real consumer guarantees.45 The ever-expanding network of
Internet of things (IoT) devices also makes notice and choice
increasingly less workable from a practical standpoint.46 How and
41

Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L.
& POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 543, 545-48 (2008) (describing the development of the FTC’s approach
to privacy policies and enforcing unfair and deceptive practices); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2014)
(describing the FTC’s entry into privacy enforcement).
42
FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (June 1998) (describing
notice as the “fundamental” basis of the FTC’s privacy approach). See also Solove & Hartzog,
supra note 41, at 634 (describing notice and choice as the “central” aspect of the agency’s work).
Cf. Joel Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russel, Alexander J. Callen, Sophia Qasir & Thomas B. Norton,
Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y
FOR INFO SOC’Y 485, 491 (describing the failures of the notice and choice mechanisms).
43
Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV.
952, 952-53 (2017).
44
Id. at 953-54; Solove, supra note 40, at 1880-82 (describing the cognitive and structural
limitations hampering the efficacy of notice and choice as a method of effective privacy
management, and noting that the solution that sufficiently grapples with the consent-based model
remains “elusive”).
45
See Hartzog, supra note 43, at 953 n.1 (detailing critiques of the FIPs since their inception);
Julie Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20.1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming
2019) (“notice-and-consent protections, which function as the principal regulatory tool in the U.S.
system and as an increasingly important backstop in the European system, simply do not work.”).
46
See Hosub Lee & Alfred Kobsa, Privacy Preference Modeling and Prediction in a Simulated
Campuswide IoT Environment, 2017 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECRONICS ENGINEERS INT’L CONF.
ON PERVASIVE COMPUTING & COMM. 276, 276 (2017) (describing the difficulty of designing
effective notice and choice mechanisms for IOT devices); Hartzog, supra note 43, at 953 (Hartzog
describes the evolving risks that have made the FIPPs increasingly obsolete, including that “[t]he
mass connectivity of the ‘Internet of Things’ and near ubiquity of mobile devices make the
security and surveillance risks presented by the isolated computer terminals and random CCTV
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when can a device provide substantive information about the
company’s data practices when the user is driving a connected car or if
the interface of the device is too small to easily read? Other IoT devices
with outward-facing sensors may also have to grapple with novel thirdparty consent problems.47 Notice and choice has been the whipping boy
of privacy scholars and advocates for a reason – it has not worked, and
it will only continue to fail consumers as new forms of interactive,
networked technology advance and spread.
1. Framing Privacy
Not only does notice and choice fail to provide consumers with a
reliable way to manage their information, but the consumers’ inability
to meaningfully engage with privacy policies and permissions settings
is one of the most frequently cited indications that individuals care very
little about their privacy.48 It is the symptom that is not only killing the
patient, but also mistakenly convinces the doctor that the condition is
benign rather than severe, compounding the damage the symptom itself
inflicts. The prevalence of individual privacy behavior that is
inconsistent with expressed preferences has given rise to the so-called
“privacy paradox,” which concludes that an individual’s behavior that
is less privacy-protective than their expressed preferences reveals a true
preference against privacy in favor of other values, such as
convenience, efficiency, or economic gain.49 While the privacy
cameras of the ‘80s and ‘90s seem quaint.”); Pardis Emami-Naeini, Sruti Bhagavatula, Hana
Habib, Martin Degeling, Lujo Bauer, Lorrie Faith Cranor & Norman Sadeh, Privacy Expectations
and Preferences in an IoT World, 2017 SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 399, 400
(noting the additional challenges that IOT devices pose for the notice and choice model, such as
“obtaining consent for data collection, allowing users to control, customize, and choose the data
they share, and ensuring the use of collected data is limited to the stated purpose”).
47
See, e.g., Cara Bloom, Joshua Tran, Javed Ramjohn & Lujo Bauer, Self-Driving Cars and Data
Collection: Privacy Perceptions of Networked Autonomous Vehicles, 2017 SYMP. ON USABLE
PRIVACY & SECURITY 357, 361 (noting that few legal protections apply to the collection of data
belonging to third parties, such as data collected by automotive sensors).
48
See, e.g., Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Measuring Privacy: An Empirical Test Using
Context to Expose Confounding Variables, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 176, 180 (2016)
(describing the conflict between reported privacy preferences and privacy behavior, and the socalled “privacy paradox”); Caleb S. Fuller, The Perils of Privacy Regulation, 30 REV. AUSTRIAN
ECON. 193, 197 (2017) (“Third, some appear puzzled by the lack of privacy protection that
contracts provide. Yet, might the absence of such protection be evidence that consumers do not
value it highly?”).
49
Idris Adjerid, Eyal Peer & Alessandro Acquisti, Beyond the Privacy Paradox: Objective versus
Relative Risk in Privacy Decision Making, 42 MGMT. INFO. SYS. Q. 465, 469-470 (2018) (defining
the privacy paradox and outlining the accompanying literature); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY
IN CONTEXT TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 104-5 (2010)
(describing the privacy paradox). See, e.g., Alan McQuinn, The Economics of “Opt-Out” Versus
“Opt-In” Privacy Rules, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION (October 6,
2017), https://perma.cc/B2UH-GPD8 (citing several studies that asked survey respondents
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paradox’s diagnosis is incorrect, the existence of the symptoms it
attempts to analyze is well-supported. People tend to assert that they
value privacy in opinion surveys, but they nevertheless take advantage
of free products and services in exchange for providing their
information50 or fail to take advantage of safeguards for their privacy,
such as reading privacy policies,51 rejecting privacy-invasive user
settings, or failing to affirmatively choose privacy-protective user
settings. In one study that ranked the privacy attitudes of participants
as high, medium, or low concern, only 46% of the high concern group
had informed themselves of the existence or content of a monitoring
policy at their school or workplace, and 41% of that same group
reported their frequency of reading privacy policies as “rare.”52 This is
logically inconsistent, but it invites a far wider range of conclusions
than simply deciding that actions must speak louder than words, and
that the validity of expressed preferences is vitiated by contradictory
behavior.
The Senate hearing in response to Facebook sharing 87 million
users’ data with Cambridge Analytica without their consent provides a
recent example of how this logic is often employed.53 As Senator Ron
Johnson questioned Mark Zuckerberg about user responses to
revelations that the social media had shared their information,
Zuckerberg said that he had not seen a “dramatic falloff” of users
leaving the platform. Johnson replied, “But it seems like Facebook
users still want to use the platform because they enjoy sharing photos
and they share the connectivity with family members, that type of
thing. And that overrides their concerns about privacy.”54 This logic
ignores the fact that Facebook, like many other technologies that create
collateral privacy risks, offers a service that may be impractical or
impossible for users to fully extricate themselves from, whether
because it is the only way to communicate with family members,
crucial for publicizing a small business, or any of the other needs that
whether they would pay for the privacy they already received for free, and concluding that the
only reason why public opinion polls claim to support strong privacy legislation “is because these
surveys rarely confront consumers with the price consequences of their choices,” and claiming
that as regulation would require consumers to pay more for privacy, they would not actually
support strong privacy legislation despite saying that they do.).
50
See Nissenbaum, supra note 49, at 105.
51
See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 41, at 550; Solove, supra note 40, at 1884.
52
Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision
Making, 3 INST. ELECTRIC & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS SECURITY & PRIVACY 26, 28 (2005).
53
See Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 115th Cong.
(2018).
54
Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, supra note 2.
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technology companies have worked hard to fill.55 For the many valid
concerns the Cambridge Analytica debacle may have given users about
their privacy, users may have equally convincing reasons not to leave
the platform, all of which the Senator (and those who would employ
similar logic) ignores.56
Similarly, in a report criticizing privacy opinion surveys and their
role in policymaking, Jim Harper and Solveig Simpleton note that
despite many surveys reporting a high level of respondent “concern”
about giving out credit card information or social security numbers
online, consumers still do so, which they conclude is a clear indication
that the reported concerns are false.57 This is an extreme example of
privacy paradox myopia, as there is a wide range of goods, services,
and opportunities that can only practically be acquired by submitting
those numbers over the Internet, and the fact that consumers are able
and willing to do so has enabled the same vibrant Internet economy
that the authors otherwise champion. The vast majority of government
benefits also require applicants and recipients to disclose their social
security number – many of these have online portals, which a person
might use despite a privacy concern out of convenience or necessity,
like a disability benefit recipient who is unable to use a phone.58 The
rationale of the privacy paradox is simplistic, and it assumes a causal
connection between preference and behavior without accounting for
the factors that separate hypothesized cause from observable effect.
Some surveys attempt to infer apathy from inconsistency, while
others simply frame their questions to elicit desired answers. One such
study conducted in 2016 by the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA),
an umbrella organization of advertising trade groups, purported to
55

See Aja Romano, How Facebook Made It Impossible to Delete Facebook, VOX (March 22,
2018, 2:00 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/5ZN9-FSDV.
56
See id. See also April Glaser, The Problem With #DeleteFacebook, SLATE (March 21, 2018,
3:46 PM) https://perma.cc/EP62-UASD (arguing that telling users to delete their Facebook
accounts ignores the extent to which the platform is just as inextricable from the lives of many of
its users as the company fought hard to become).
57
JIM HARPER & SOLVEIG SIMPLETON, WITH A GRAIN OF SALT: WHAT CONSUMER PRIVACY
SURVEYS DON’T TELL US 4 (2001), https://perma.cc/8R82-FHW2.
58
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-768T, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS: USE IS
WIDESPREAD AND PROTECTIONS VARY 11 (2004) (detailing the range of government benefits that
require SSN disclosure); Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Online Services for Key Low-Income
Benefit Programs: What States Provide Online With Respect to SNAP, TANF, Child Care
Assistance, Medicaid, CHIP, and General Assistance (July 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/EM2FU3Q3 (discussing and listing the various state benefit programs with online components). To
receive unemployment benefits in the state of Maryland, for examples, recipients are able to file
weekly forms through an online portal, WEBCERT, using their SSN as a username. See Md. Dept.
of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, Webcert Logon (last visited Sept. 23, 2018),
https://perma.cc/E74N-AZP5.
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demonstrate that consumers actively want an Internet supported by
advertising, which was then used to argue that privacy regulation that
could hamper advertisers’ pervasive tracking contravened consumers’
wishes.59 But the indirect logic here is by design, as the survey’s
questions provide questions designed to promote a framing of free
services versus paid services, relying on the inference that if consumers
prefer not paying for things then they do not value privacy or legal
protections for it.60 Similar arguments have been posed as to the
precision of advertising, with industry representatives arguing that any
survey demonstrating that consumers value tailored advertisements
means that they do not support privacy regulation that could hinder that
targeting in any way.61 The very premise of the question ignores the
existence of privacy risks engendered by companies collecting
enormous amounts of data and using it in opaque ways, the ill
regulation seeks to mitigate. In a world without data breaches, identity
theft, and information misuse, I share most peoples’s preference for
free services. But use of a product or service cannot be extrapolated to
indicate endorsement of its drawbacks, or support for permissive
59

For example, in comments to the Federal Communications Commission arguing against
implementation of the Commission’s now-defunct broadband privacy rule, Dan Jaffe of the
Association of National Advertisers argued that the rule would be contrary to the public interest
as “consumers want, expect, and benefit from interest-based advertising.” See ANA comments,
supra note 8, at 11. Similarly, Luigi Mastria of the Digital Advertising Alliance cited statistics
from a 2013 survey conducted by Zogby and DAA as evidence of why consumers do not
support Internet browsers that block cookies, which are a fundamental component of web
tracking. Luigi Mastria, Hearing on A Status Update On The Development Of Voluntary DoNot-Track Standards Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 113th
Cong. 9 (April 24, 2013) (statement of Luigi Mastria); Alison M. Cheperdak, Double Trouble:
Why Two Internet Privacy Enforcement Agencies Are Not Better than One for Business or
Consumers, 70 FED. COMM. L. J. 261, 294 (2018) (arguing that “[t]he FCC's increased
regulations will have a negative impact on consumers because most consumers are not opposed
to sharing information with Internet business in exchange for free or discounted services,” citing
the 2016 DAA/Zogby survey, see infra note 60 and accompanying text, that reported “[m]ore
than 85 percent of respondents said they preferred [that] ad-supported Internet model instead of
paying for online content.”).
60
DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, ZOGBY ANALYTICS PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON VALUE
OF THE AD-SUPPORTED INTERNET 5 (May 2016), https://perma.cc/9PM7-9RBT (“Question 11:
Which of the following would you prefer: an Internet where there are no ads, but you have to
pay for most content you read/see like blogs, entertainment sites, video content and social
media, or today’s Internet in which there are ads, but most content is free?”). Unsurprisingly,
85% answered “an ad-supported Internet where most content is free,” and only 14% opted for “a
paid Internet where everything cost money because there is no advertising.” Id. at 5 (emphasis
added).
61
See, e.g., Daniel Castro, Stricter Privacy Regulations for Online Advertising Will Harm the
Free Internet, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION (Sept. 2010),
https://perma.cc/E5VH-8YLC (noting that found that stricter privacy laws in the EU diminished
the effectiveness of advertising and other evidence to claim “[t]he evidence clearly suggests that
the tradeoffs of stronger privacy laws result in less free and low-cost content and more spam (i.e.
unwanted ads) which is not in the interests of most consumers.”).
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privacy regulation that allows those drawbacks to perpetuate. Other
surveys have used similar framing devices to elicit responses that seem
to undermine a public desire for privacy, like another DAA survey that
asked “[w]ould you support a law that restricted how data is used for
Internet advertising, but also potentially reduced the availability of free
content like blogs and video sites online?”62 This provides the evidence
the study’s funders intend to produce, but contributes no meaningful
information about the respondents’ actual thoughts on privacy
legislation.
The use of deliberately framed survey responses as empirical
evidence of widespread privacy apathy contributes to broad
misunderstandings of privacy norms and enables a lax regulatory
regime when used as ammunition against policy reforms. When an
individual’s control over their information through notice and choice
mechanisms is used as a representative illustration of their privacy
preferences and expectations, it is possible to conclude that the failure
to exercise that control constitutes a deliberate rejection of privacy. In
reality, a range of cognitive and structural forces impede the
individuals’ incentives and abilities to take privacy-protective steps,
obstacles that tend to be ignored in the rhetorical haste to drive the last
nail into privacy’s coffin.
The following sub-parts will detail the structural and cognitive
limitations that complicate the conclusions of the privacy paradox, and
illustrate the difficulty of relying on user privacy decision-making (or
on surveys that ignore the barriers to coherent privacy decisionmaking) as a referendum on public privacy preferences or expectations.
2. Structural Limitations
The information asymmetry between consumers and datacollecting entities is perhaps the greatest impediment to delivering
functional notice or meaningful choice. Consumers do not understand
how privacy policies are intended to work, and most privacy policies
fail to effectively convey the information they are intended to provide.
In many contexts, a company may not even be able to disclose the
trajectory of where the consumer’s information might travel because it
does not know what third parties might receive the consumer’s
information or how they might use it.63 Few people read privacy
62

Interactive Survey of US Adults, DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE (Apr. 2013),
https://perma.cc/2WHM-G4TW.
63
Researchers continually discover new ways in which consumer behavior is tracked online;
activity that is usually unknown to consumers and sometimes unknown to both the consumer
and the company. See Gunes Acar, Steven Englehardt & Arvind Narayan, No Boundaries for
User Identities: Web Trackers Exploit Browser Login Managers, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Dec.
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policies, and those who do are left with little basis to understand the
uses of their data.64
When individuals do take the time to read privacy policies,
they tend not to understand what they mean. Multiple studies have
illustrated that most individuals have a tenuous grasp of what a privacy
policy is actually intended to accomplish.65 In one such study, more
than half of respondents believed that “[w]hen a company posts a
privacy policy, it ensures that the company keeps confidential all the
information it collects on users.”66 The typical privacy policy does
nothing of the sort, and is designed to provide regulatory cover for the
data collecting entity as much as it is to inform the user; if anything,
privacy policies are more accurately described as corporate
disclaimers, rather than consumer guarantees. As Senator John
Kennedy memorably described it to Mark Zuckerberg as he testified in
the Senate, “[t]he purpose of that user agreement is to cover Facebook's
rear end. It's not to inform your users about their rights … tell your
$1,200 an hour lawyers … you want it written in English and nonSwahili, so the average American can understand it. That would be a
start.”67 In one study that interviewed experts, knowledgeable users,
27, 2017), https://perma.cc/G6PR-F4QG (explaining “how a long-known vulnerability in
browsers’ built-in password managers [was] abused by third-party scripts for tracking on more
than a thousand sites.”); Steven Englehardt, Gunes Acar & Arvind Narayan, No Boundaries:
Exfiltration of Personal Data by Session-Replay Scripts, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://perma.cc/R3BZ-PKKD (reporting that when third-party analytics scripts record user
online behavior such as keystrokes and mouse behavior, “the extent of data collected by these
services far exceeds user expectations,” particularly when “[t]his data can’t reasonably be
expected to be kept anonymous.”). See also Steven Englehardt, Gunes Acar & Arvind Narayan,
Website Operators Are in the Dark about Privacy Violations by Third-Party Scripts, FREEDOM
TO TINKER (Jan. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/5NJZ-AKLG (discussing the trio’s previous
research and noting that many websites had no relationship with the third parties exploiting their
user data, or any idea that the exploitation was occurring).
64
Solove, supra note 40, at 1884 (citing research demonstrating how few people read privacy
policies); Martin & Nissenbaum, supra note 48, at 180, n.4 (describing studies that document
how little consumers understand how their data might be used); Joshua Gluck, Florian Schaub,
Amy Friedman, Hana Habib, Norman Sadeh, Lorrie Faith Cranor & Yuvraj Agarwal, How
Short Is Too Short? Implications of Length and Framing on the Effectiveness of Privacy
Notices, 2016 SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 321, 322 (noting that “It is fairly rare
for individuals to read a privacy policy in its entirety” due to their complexity and length);
JOSEPH TUROW, MICHAEL HENNESSY & NORA DRAPER, THE TRADEOFF FALLACY: HOW
MARKETERS ARE MISREPRESENTING CONSUMERS AND OPENING THEM UP TO EXPLOITATION 8
(2015), https://perma.cc/WL5V-U5WV (“[S]ome lawyers who write the policies for large
companies have acknowledged to Joseph Turow that the documents are legal tender not
designed to be understood by ordinary people.”).
65
See Turow et al, supra note 64, at 8; Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know
What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (December 4, 2014) https://perma.cc/9GBKH4HM .
66
See Smith, supra note 65.
67
Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, supra note 2.
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and untrained crowd-workers, frequent disagreements emerged
between the experts regarding the meaning of key terms, as did
disagreements between the expert consensus and the consensus of the
crowdsourced workers.68 This demonstrates both the opacity of privacy
policies generally and their tendency to confuse the average consumer
–both of which contradict the idea that informational selfdetermination through notice and choice reflects an informed decisionmaking process.
That privacy policies are long and difficult to understand prevents
people from reading them, but shorter policies would likely fail to
adequately describe the relevant practices a user should know.69
Privacy policies are given the impossible task of providing information
that is sufficiently complete, yet perfectly digestible for consumers,
while fulfilling regulatory requirements.70 Consumers are trapped
between a rock and a hard place; privacy policies are too long to be
worth reading, yet they fail to convey relevant information needed to
make an informed decision. Moreover, they are highly unlikely to
disappear from how consumer privacy is governed anytime in the near
future.71 At the same time, poor understanding of the Internet
ecosystem also engenders misleading survey results.72
The same lack of understanding of the substance and applicability
of privacy policies seems to persist in users’ understandings of
application permissions, corporate data practices, and surveillance
68

See Joel Reidenberg, Travis Breaux, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Brian French, Amanda Grannis, James
T. Graves, Fei Liu, Aleecia McDonald, Thomas B. Norton, Rohan Ramanath, N. Cameron
Russell, Norman Sadeh & Florian Schaub, Disagreeable Privacy Polices: Mismatches Between
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERK. TECH. L. J. 39, 86-87 (2015). See also Cranor,
supra note 28, at 274 (noting that privacy policies are “long, complicated, full of jargon, and
change frequently.”).
69
See generally Gluck et al., supra note 64; Kanthashree Mysore Sathyendra, Shomir Wilson,
Florian Schaub, Sebastian Zimmeck & Norman Sadeh, Identifying the Provision of Choices in
Privacy Policy Text, 2017 CONF. ON EMPIRICAL METHODS NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING 2774,
2774, https://perma.cc/V33S-THRQ (noting that the level of education required to understand the
average privacy policy is higher than that of the average individual).
70
Jialiu Lin, Bin Liu, Norman Sadeh & Jason I. Hong, Modeling Users’ Mobile App Privacy
Preferences: Restoring Usability in a Sea of Permission Settings 2017 CONF. ON EMPIRICAL
METHODS IN NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING 2774, 2774 (describing the competing requirements
of privacy policies and the difficulty of simultaneously fulfilling all of them).
71
See generally Solove, supra note 40, at 1885 (discussing the “fundamental dilemma” of notice).
72
Turow et al., supra note 64, at 4-5 (reporting widespread misconceptions about advertising, for
example, “49% of American adults who use the internet believe (incorrectly) that by law a
supermarket must obtain a person’s permission before selling information about that person’s
food purchases to other companies,” and that 65% did not know that the statement “[w]hen a
website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share my information with other websites
and companies without my permission” is false). See also Tokson, supra note 13, at 179-180
(distinguishing knowledge polls as less vulnerable to distortion than opinion polls, as they make
fewer faulty assumptions based on information respondents do not possess).
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practices. In one study, only 22% of participants understood that
applications continue to run in the background when the user is not
directly engaged with them and that an app can still access their
information when not in use.73 Even when individuals are fully
informed and take proactive steps to protect their privacy, their actions
may not have the desired impact. In one example, researchers at
Princeton demonstrated that when a smartphone user turns off location
services, her location can still be deduced from other sources of
publicly-available information.74 Another study demonstrated the
limited efficacy of popular tracking blockers and browser plug-ins, as
many users mistakenly believed they had successfully shielded their
browsing activity.75 And let’s not forget the constant barrage of data
breaches hitting companies large and small, obviating whatever
promises those companies made to their users about the privacy or
security of their information.76 Other companies may employ
technological workarounds to infer information that their privacy
policies claim they refrain from collecting, making the disclaimers in
their privacy policies, should consumers take the time to read them,
hollow.77 These structural forces – from the lack of consumer
knowledge about how privacy policies work, to the frequent inability
of companies to effectively disclose practices outside their control –
make it all but impossible for consumers to make meaningful decisions
that exert effective control over their information.78
73

Lynn Tsai, Primal Wijesekera, Joel Reardon, Irwin Reyes, Serge Egelman, David Wagner,
Nathan Good & Jung-Wei Chen, Turtle Guard: Helping Android Users Apply Contextual Privacy
Preferences, 148, 2017 SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 145, 148, citing Christopher
Thompson, Maritza Johnson, Serge Egelman, David Wagner & Jennifer King, When It’s Better
to Ask Forgiveness than Get Permission: Attribution Mechanisms for Smartphone Resources,
2013 SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 1, 3.
74
Arsalan Mosenia, Xiaoliang Dai, Prateek Mittal & Niraj K. Jha, PinMe: Tracking a Smartphone
User around the World, 4 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS TRANSACTIONS ON
MULTI-SCALE COMPUTING SYSTEMS 420, 420 (2017).
75
William Melicher, Mahmood Sharif, Joshua Tan, Lujo Bauer, Mihai Christodorescu, & Pedro
Giovanni Leon, (Do Not) Track Me Sometimes: Users’ Contextual Preferences for Web Tracking,
2016 PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECH. 135, 137, citing Pedro Leon, Blase Ur, Richard Shay,
Yang Wang, Rebecca Balebako & Lorrie Cranor, Why Johnny Can’t Opt Out: A Usability
Evaluation of Tools to Limit Online Behavioral Advertising, 2012 CONF. ON HUMAN FACTORS
COMPUTING SYSTEMS.
76
See, e.g., Christopher Mele, Data Breaches Keep Happening. So Why Don’t You Do
Something?, N.Y.T. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/technology/databreaches.html (describing the millions of Americans affected by the barrage of hacks and the
difficulty of both breach response and prevention).
77
Hoofnagle, supra note 39, at 170, n. 92 (describing “reverse enhancement,” where a data broker
uses one form of information and other databases to deduce a consumer’s home address).
78
See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 9 149 (“disclosure is a ritual to be endured”), quoting OMRI
BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 10 (2014).
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3. Cognitive Limitations
While the informational asymmetry discussed presents a baseline
obstacle to rational privacy decision-making, cognitive limitations also
skew the process, further preventing privacy behavior from accurately
reflecting users’ privacy preferences or expectations. The logic of
notice and choice assumes a baseline consumer rationality in privacy
decision-making that is rarely, if ever, present79 – and if privacy
decision-making is not rational, the logic that individuals do not want
privacy protections because they fail to engage with notice and choice
is fundamentally unsound.
Social scientists and privacy scholars have described the
cognitive phenomena that impede rational decision-making, such as
hyperbolic discounting, which posits that people assign a lesser value
to less ascertainable, far-off rewards, and higher value to rewards that
are easily acquired.80 In the case of privacy decision-making, when a
privacy policy is densely opaque, and the possible benefit of preventing
a hypothetical privacy harm is juxtaposed with the immediate benefit
of a sales discount or free WiFi, hyperbolic discounting is one of the
reasons why the overwhelming majority of the population would
choose the latter.81 The possibility that a snoop might be intercepting
an individual’s web traffic, and that the traffic could be directly or
inferentially valuable enough to the snoop to somehow cause her harm,
seems tenuous and remote compared to the concrete and immediate
reward of Internet access.
A similar phenomenon is the idea of bounded rationality, which
posits that humans are fundamentally limited in the amount of
information and skills we can harness and apply to a given decision,
and therefore use simplified metrics and approximations that are
ultimately unrepresentative, resulting in an irrational outcome.82
Otherwise put, it contradicts the idea that consumers will generally act
in a rational way, maximizing utility and their own self-interest at any

79

See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 52, at 26.
See generally Solove, supra note 40, 1883; Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 52, at 31.
81
Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 52, at 31.
82
Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate
Gratification, 2004 PROC. ASS’N COMPUTING MACHINERY CONF. ON ELEC. COM. 21, 23;
Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 52, at 30; Alessandro Acquisti, Idris Adjerid, Rebecca
Balebako, Laura Brandimarte, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Saranga Komanduri, Pedro Giovanni Leon,
Norman Sadeh, Florian Schaub, Manya Sleeper, Yang Wang & Shomir Wilson, Nudges for
Privacy and Security: Understanding and Assisting Users’ Choices Online, 50 ASS’N
COMPUTING MACHINERY COMPUTING SURVEYS Art. 44, at 2 (2017) (defining bounded
rationality).
80
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given turn.83 Privacy decisions are particularly shaped by bounded
rationality, as privacy choices are usually abstract and based on
incomplete information, making a correct mental model of the decision
all the more difficult to summon. In short, individuals often fail to
engage in exactly the kind of clear-eyed, conditional thinking upon
which the conclusion of the privacy paradox depends.84
Another cognitive phenomenon that affects individual decisionmaking is the common difficulty of accurately assessing the impact of
cumulative risk. A phenomenon that may feel relatable to many readers
(or at least to the author) occurs when people often discount the
ultimate danger created by the series of incremental steps that will
ultimately permit that danger to take place. In conjunction with
hyperbolic discounting, this means a user is not only favoring the
immediate reward over the possible risk when assessing a possibly
privacy-invasive scenario, but failing to correctly ascertain that initial
risk, even when the decision may not produce a reward. Examples
include assessing the danger of small decisions like repeatedly using
unsecured public WiFi networks, or failing to use strong and different
passwords for a range of different online accounts against the risk of
identity theft.85 These risks may be even more challenging for
connected devices where the context of data collection may seem more
limited, but the possibilities for abuse are not.86 Conversely, while an
amorphous risk and the value of dignity may be difficult for consumers
to quantify when assessing a transaction, the data collector faces no
such difficulty in quantifying the value of consumers’ information.87
The way that individuals process risk is highly relevant for
understanding both how notice and choice actually functions, and for
correctly interpreting surveys that purport to measure which privacy
risks individuals care about.
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Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
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Decision fatigue further limits the efficacy of notice and choice.
Consumers are faced with a constant barrage of privacy decisions,
which compounds the difficulty of making privacy decisions that suit
their expectations or preferences. These decisions include reading
privacy policies, terms of service, checking application permissions,
and others. As these decisions are nearly constant, a user engaging with
them in a meaningful way, reading every privacy policy or going to the
website of every app or IoT device, is not only unlikely but an
impractical use of one’s time.88 One study famously estimated that it
would take the average American internet user forty-minutes per day
on average to read every privacy policy she came across, at a cost of
$2,533-$5,038 a year.89 Declining to read a privacy policy could be
attributed to rational ignorance, when a consumer makes an
economically logical decision not to seek out a sufficient explanation
about a given scenario, such as deciding to forego the requisite time to
read a privacy policy that will ultimately fail to effectively convey the
necessary information anyway.90 To make matters more confusing,
providing too much control, by providing consumers with exhaustive
information as to every way in which their data is used and every time
it is used, can have the paradoxical effect of paralyzing individuals,
rather than empowering them.91
The cognitive phenomena and informational asymmetry that
prevent consumers from making privacy decisions that suit their
preferences are considerable. But even when consumers are
knowledgeable about how their information is used, the risks a given
decision can create, and the basic steps they can take to mitigate those
risks, consumers still fail to take those mitigating steps due to
resignation, rather than apathy towards their privacy or an affirmative
decision to subordinate their privacy preference to another value.92 The
difference between a person’s privacy preference and their privacy
expectations can further help diagnose the incoherence between
commonly expressed privacy preferences and ultimate privacy
behavior. A person with a preference for privacy acts in the hope that
her action will protect her information; a person with an expectation of
88

McDonald & Cranor, supra note 41, at 544.
Id. at 563-64.
90
Tokson, supra note 13, at 167 (defining rational ignorance generally and as a flaw in the
reasonable expectation of privacy test’s reliance on individual knowledge of privacy and
technology).
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Hartzog, supra note 43, at 975.
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Turow et al., supra note 64, at 13, 17 (defining resignation, and reporting that “[T]he more a
person knows about information collection in the marketing world, the more likely the
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privacy is convinced that it will. The convergence of a strong privacy
preference, with the conviction that any pro-privacy steps will fail to
accomplish their stated goal, illustrates a key part of the “paradox”—
the resignation of the informed consumer.93 “Learned helplessness”
describes when an individual in a negative situation with no recourse
to change it accepts the situation as a coping mechanism – lack of
power to change the cause of the negative circumstance shapes the
individual’s response to it.94 A study on Americans’ attitudes towards
online privacy and tradeoffs reported that the majority of those who
were willing to trade their information for discounts under certain
scenarios did so resigned to the possible risks, rather than as a rational
decision weighing privacy, utility, and possible adverse outcomes.95
The study further reported that those who are the most informed about
online privacy are the most likely to be resigned to its abuse.96
When privacy skeptics and motivated industry coalitions use
flawed methodologies to arrive at desired policy conclusions, their
evidence appears convincing; it seems that consumers do not actually
want the privacy protections that regulators would give them, and as
privacy is a good to barter away rather than a right that must be shielded
at a basic threshold from certain harms, any privacy enforcement (such
as a new rule, law, or interpretation of policy) should be heavily
influenced by those wishes.97 Surely, if consumers will offer their email
addresses in exchange for the use of public WiFi, they have rationally
weighed the costs and the benefits of the transaction and concluded that
they do not want to pay for the services they have grown accustomed
to receiving for free. To ignore their choice in a free market would seem
paternalistic and undemocratic.98 And unlike other areas of the law,
93

Id. at 17.
Bloom et al., supra note 47, at 367 (discussing learned helplessness, and remarking that learned
helplessness could have impacted the response of participants who rated a potentially privacyinvasive scenario as ‘likely’ who were more likely to be comfortable with that scenario).
95
Turow et al., supra note 64, at 4, 14 (58% were “resigned” to the misuse of their information,
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Id. at 9. As limiting as anecdotal proof is, this phenomenon seems logical to me, as I write this
paper on privacy behavior and expectations while connected to the open WiFi network of my bus.
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See, e.g., Meredith Kapushion, Hungy, Hungry HIPAA: When Privacy Regulations Go Too Far,
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1491 (2004) (criticizing HIPAA for not accommodating divergent
consumer desires for their health data to be monetized).
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should be left free to make choices for themselves, even when some of those choices strike others
as unwise . . . . [A]ssertions that people cannot be trusted to look out for themselves … would
imply that the benefits of regulation are virtually boundless and that the costs should generally be
ignored in order to essentially save consumers from their own choices.”).
94

2018]

Model(ing) Privacy

25

where stronger guardrails exist to prevent consumers from being
fleeced by an unconscionable transaction they purportedly want to
engage in, privacy would seem to present no such countervailing
concern, with the exception of the most concrete and egregious
physical and monetary harms.
But as this article has hopefully begun to demonstrate, these
arguments depend on a rational privacy decision-making process that
simply do not exist. Opinion surveys fail to account for the heavy role
that context plays in privacy decision-making, the lack of information
most individuals have about the information ecosystem, and the
cognitive phenomena that impact privacy decision-making that all
contribute to the fallacy of the informed and rational privacy decisionmaker. Advertising-dependent industries have strong incentives to
keep privacy as unregulated as possible, and to make motivated
arguments that a system dependent on a fallacious behavioral model is
the only possible way to preserve freedom and innovation. Those
arguments are politically useful, and they’ve often worked. As long as
consumer privacy is considered to be a good that individuals should
always have the right to trade away, motivated analysis of flawed
methodologies will continue to provide support for arguments that
dress commercial or ideological objectives in democratic clothing. The
simple fact that someone might answer that they care about their
privacy in a survey, and yet use public WiFi, will continue to be offered
as proof that whatever privacy law aims to protect, consumers neither
need nor want it.
Introducing new types of privacy research into policymaking will
not affect the incentives of the stakeholders making those arguments.
But empirical research that is able to measure privacy preferences,
expectations, and behavior accurately – by accounting for the context
of different privacy decisions, the loaded premises behind broad
questions about complex technology, and the fallacy of the rational
privacy decision-maker – can help illustrate for regulators and the
public which policy prescriptions are medicinal, and which are snake
oil designed to benefit the companies that sell them, in addition to
illuminating privacy preferences, expectations and behaviors that are
often difficult to discern.
Of course, the possibility remains that when individuals make
decisions that do not prioritize privacy, they are simply prioritizing
other values such as increased convenience, functionality, or a good or
service. Not every privacy decision is an indictment of the notice and
choice system. Like most goods, the value of privacy in a given
circumstance is finite; like most rights, it is rarely absolute. But for that
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assessment to be accurate, it must be based on informed and
meaningful privacy decision-making which, due to the cognitive and
structural limitations discussed above, rarely exists in practice.99
Asserting that decision-making under these circumstances reflects a
free and informed choice is a facile distortion of how real people think
and act, and should be repudiated when used as evidence of popular
enthusiasm for permissive privacy regulation. For the use of notice and
choice to provide a remotely faithful snapshot of individual privacy
preferences and expectations – and for empirical research to do the
same – the barriers to coherent decision-making must be fully
accounted for.100
B. The Fourth Amendment
Whereas social science is often poorly used in consumer privacy
legal and policy discussions, it is rarely used to inform assessments of
a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
Regulators and legislators ask the public for input on how they should
approach privacy issues, which creates a space for research to answer
their questions: judges usually do not. In both areas, government
decision-makers struggle to discern privacy norms that they need to
understand in order to interpret or create the law – evaluating what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment has proven particularly challenging in the case of
emerging technology.101
As a baseline, the Constitution protects privacy from government
intrusion in the Fourth Amendment, which states that the government
must obtain a warrant based on probable cause before searching or
seizing persons, papers, places, or effects.102 This has been interpreted
through subsequent cases to mean that the government must obtain a
warrant in order to search or seize something in which a person has a
subjective expectation of privacy that society would deem objectively
See, e.g., Turow et al., supra note 64, at 16 (finding that most Americans don’t have the basic
knowledge to make informed cost-benefit choices).
100
Id. at 3 (“Marketers justify their data-collection practices with the notion of tradeoffs, depicting
an informed public that understands the opportunities and costs of giving up its data and makes
the positive decision to do so . . . . This image of a powerful consumer has become a way to claim
to policymakers and the media that Americans accept widespread tracking of their backgrounds,
behaviors, and lifestyles across devices, even though surveys repeatedly show they object to these
activities.”); id. at 20 (“The findings indicate substantial tensions in a central area of society’s
public sphere that cannot be swept away by executives’ assertions of consumer autonomy and
rational choice.”).
101
See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 481 (2011),
102
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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reasonable, unless a warrant exception applies.103 While there have
been a few landmark cases that have recognized the need for new
rules,104 most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is hamstrung by
doctrinal principles that far predate the technology to which the
principle is applied, resulting in outcomes that undermine the
underlying values of the Amendment.105 While a common law system
necessarily requires extending old principles to new facts, judges have
to be able to accurately assess societal norms, which they are rarely
positioned to be able to do well.106 Fourth Amendment protections end
up being tied to the reasonable judge’s expectation of privacy, not the
reasonable person’s. The result is a similar mismatch of what legal
doctrine presupposes and how human beings actually think and act.
1. Analog Doctrines
One aspect of why evaluating a modern reasonable expectation of
privacy is so difficult is that technology has outpaced the applicability
of the logic supporting many Fourth Amendment doctrines, creating
the need for new rules that will uphold, rather than contravene, the
privacy protections the Constitution is intended to confer.
Perhaps the most glaring instance of a blunt Fourth Amendment
standard that fails to account for the categorically disruptive impact of
new technology is the third-party doctrine. This is the idea that by
entrusting information to a third party, the sender extinguishes her
expectation of privacy in the information. The doctrine originally
developed in two cases, United States v. Miller, and Smith v. Maryland,
103

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Riley v. California,
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483-84 (2014) (describing Fourth Amendment exceptions). See also Slobogin
& Schumacher, supra note 11, at 731 (describing the evolution of the “societal understanding” of
privacy norms as a function of the Katz test).
104
See e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (holding that a cell phone is not a container for search incident
to arrest purposes, and that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to search one); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40-41 (2001) (holding that a search of the home using a device that is
not in public use is presumptively unreasonable); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286
(6th Cir. 2010) (finding that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails
despite the fact that they were stored on a third-party server).
105
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The
Court argues – and I agree – that ‘we must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”’ But it is almost impossible
to think of late 18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in this case. (Is it
possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself somewhere in a coach and
remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner?)”
(citations omitted)).
106
Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 649 (2013)
(describing the flaws of binary Fourth Amendment doctrines and arguing that a context-based
approach can provide a more accurate descriptive measure of privacy norms, as well as a more
coherent structure to judicial analysis of Fourth Amendment cases).
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involving the privacy interest in the routing numbers sent to the
defendant’s bank, and the privacy interest in the phone numbers sent to
the defendant’s phone company respectively.107 But in the digital age,
it is essentially impossible to communicate without entrusting a range
of information to digital service providers. Sending a text message
requires the cell phone’s signal to be collected by the nearest cell tower,
and for a smart phone, often to a provider of cloud storage services as
well. The use of email or the Internet requires routing traffic through
an Internet service provider.108 The mulishly bifurcated reasoning of
the third-party doctrine creates a scenario where a text message cannot
contain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the situation where a
folded paper note would because in application the doctrine fails to
consider the context separating various new applications.
Other tenets of Fourth Amendment doctrine are subject to similar
critique. The automobile exception provides that under most
circumstances, a police officer does not require a warrant to search a
vehicle. This logic is predicated on the exigency concern of searching
a mobile entity, as well as the idea that the pervasive regulation of
automobiles undermines a reasonable expectation of privacy in one.109
It is also about as binary a standard as they come – the degree of
mobility of an entity does not control whether it is considered a
“vehicle” for the purposes of the exception, including cases like an
immobile trailer.110 But the vast majority of vehicles are now equipped
with GPS, such that the vehicle keeps a careful record of the drivers’
location history. Infotainment systems also allow drivers to sync the
contact information in their cellphones, or the information from
intelligent assistant devices located in their homes, an area that is
afforded the strongest possible Fourth Amendment protections.111 This
categorically changes the privacy interests involved in searching a
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United States v. Miller 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 74344 (1979).
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vehicle,112 and could not have been taken into account in the case that
established the exception in 1925.113
Another blunt standard rendered inapt by technology is the
content/non-content distinction, a line of jurisprudence that holds that
unlike the content of communications, related “non-content”
information associated with the communications have no Fourth
Amendment privacy interest.114 This distinction arose through a series
of cases, starting with Ex parte Jackson, which distinguished the
contents of a letter from the information on its envelope,115 and was
established more fully in Smith, which distinguished the contents of a
telephone conversation from the telephone numbers dialed by the
caller.116 The content/non-content distinction is also present in the
Stored Communications Act (SCA), a law designed to limit the
government’s access to the electronic information held by network
intermediaries.117 The statute requires the government to seek a warrant
for the contents of electronic communications, but permits it to obtain
“records or other information pertaining to a subscriber” on the basis
of a subpoena showing that there are “reasonable grounds” that the
information is “relevant and material” to the investigation.118 The
binary distinction is determinative here; content requires a warrant
while non-content does not. However, subscriber information,
customer records, and other non-content can be far more revealing that
the distinction implies, particularly in aggregate.119 Metadata – “data
112

Lindsey Barrett, supra note 24, at 194 (arguing that the privacy implications of the data
collected by connected cars and automated vehicle undermine the logic of the Fourth
Amendment’s automobile exception, such that a warrant should be required to search vehicle
data).
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Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
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See, e.g., Paula Kift & Helen Nissenbaum, Metadata in Context – An Ontological and
Normative Analysis of the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection Program, 13 I/S: J. L. &
POL’Y FOR INFO SOC’Y 333, 372 (2017) (“[T]he main assumption underlying the NSA’s
justification for the bulk telephony metadata collection program – namely, that metadata is
equivalent to non-sensitive data – no longer makes sense. Indeed, in light of the theory of
contextual integrity, it never made any sense to begin with.”).
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Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
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Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
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18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
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Id. § 2703(d).
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Ian Samuel, The New Writs of Assistance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2892 (2018) (noting
that “[t]he government can and does use its power under the SCA to force the disclosure of
enormous amounts of sensitive information about the users of network services,” such as personal
addresses, IP addresses, and account information for tweets relating to a leak of classified
information); William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under
the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L. J. 1195, 1208 (2010) (noting that for both electronic
communications service providers and remote communications service providers, the two types
of service providers subject to the SCA, “personal identifying information about the user such as
her name, physical or e-mail addresses, and IP address, is entitled to little protection”). See also
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about data,” like the size of a Microsoft word document, the location a
text was sent from, or the time stamp on an email120 – constitutes noncontent, and can thus be acquired by the police on a standard akin to
reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, by virtue of that designation.
Yet metadata itself can be tremendously revealing, in addition to the
fact that it creates structured datasets that are relatively easy for
computers to analyze.121
The Fourth Amendment’s forced binary of the public/private
distinction is another example of a blunt test that ignores the
transformative impact of technology on the facts driving older
doctrines and differences of modern expectations.122 The public view
doctrine provides that there is no expectation of privacy in something
public, such as marijuana plants on private property visible from a lowflying airplane.123 However, there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information so difficult to obtain that law enforcement must
use technology that is not in “general public use” to perceive it.124 Here,
too, the distinctions are more nuanced than that rule might suggest. In
United States v. Knotts, when the police attached a tracking device to
the defendants’ vehicle, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
that merited a warrant, as the defendants’ movements were in public.125
Though a later GPS tracking case was decided on the basis of the
trespass, two concurrences questioned the warrantless invasion of
privacy that was permitted by twenty-eight days of tracking a vehicle,
regardless of the fact the movements were public.126 The prodigious
spread of public surveillance technologies, such as drones, CCTVs,

Gabriel R. Schlabach, Privacy In The Cloud: The Mosaic Theory and the Stored Communications
Act, 67 STANFORD. L. REV 677, 697 (2015) (arguing that an amendment to the SCA to incorporate
mosaic theory is needed to adequately protect user privacy). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 320, 347 (2012) (proposing and
rejecting the viability of an approach to Fourth Amendment searches that evaluated government
conduct in aggregate, rather than sequentially, acknowledging the outsized privacy implications
that low-cost surveillance methods enabled by new technology without being defined as a
“search” under current doctrine).
120
See Kift & Nissenbaum, supra note 114, at 336 (defining metadata).
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See, e.g., Lee & Kobsa, supra note 46, at 288 (describing the creation of datasets to “build
machine learning models to predict future privacy decisions).
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See Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information
Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207, 208 (1997); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy In Public, 69 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 141, 142 (2014) (arguing that the spread of ubiquitous public surveillance
undermines Fourth Amendment privacy protections); Selbst, supra note 106, at 650.
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958 (Alito, J., concurring).
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automated license plate readers, and facial recognition databases have
further eroded the public-private distinction.127
2. The Reasonable Judge’s Expectation of Privacy
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of coalescing Fourth
Amendment doctrine with the realities of technology is that the
reasonable expectation of privacy test requires a judge to determine
what privacy norms are, a difficult task that they are poorly equipped
to do.128 Studies attempting to provide empirical answers for what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy have found that the
norms that judges rely on in their cases often contradict the norms
reported by average individuals.129 For example, in United States v.
Forrester, the Ninth Circuit found that there was no expectation of
privacy in the websites a person visits or the email addresses with
which they correspond, analogizing to the phone numbers dialed in
Smith.130 The court reasoned that on the basis of assumption of the risk,
and the distinction between content (the email) and non-content (the
address whence it was sent), there was no privacy interest protected by
the Fourth Amendment, and to whatever extent there was, the
defendant repudiated it by trusting a third party, the service provider.
This would likely surprise the majority of individuals who think that a
warrant should be required to access the email addresses they have
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See generally Reidenberg, supra note 122, at 147. See also GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH.,
THE PERPETUAL LINEUP 25-26 (2016), https://perma.cc/8V9G-XHWT (detailing the pervasive
use of facial recognition technology in city, state, and federal law enforcement).
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See Spencer, supra note 83, at 846-47; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 11, at 732 (“[T]he
results strongly suggest that some of the Court's decisions regarding the threshold of the Fourth
Amendment and the warrant and probable cause requirements do not reflect societal
understandings. Indeed, some of the Court's conclusions in this regard may be well off the
mark.”).
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See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 11, at 732 (describing the results of an empirical study
on privacy expectations, and concluding that the Supreme Court’s understanding of those
expectations often contradicts the norm); Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs.
Reasonable Lay Persons In The Supreme Court’s Miranda And Fourth Amendment Cases, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481, 1499 (2010) (arguing that judges rely on contradictory standards
for the reasonable officer and the reasonable lay person); Marc McAllister, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U.
L. J. 475, 477-78 (2012) (arguing that misplaced analogical reasoning often skews judicial
perception of societal expectation of privacy, including with respect to attitudes concerning
assumption of the risk and the third party doctrine); Steven L. Chanenson, Get The Facts, Jack!
Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN.
L. REV. 399, 437 (2004) (arguing for increased use of empirical evidence to provide more accurate
information about societal perceptions about consent searches, namely under what circumstances
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United States v. Forrester, 512 F. 3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2007).
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corresponded with, contradicting the basis for the third-party doctrine
(and the holding of Forrester).131
The survey also reported other ways in which judges tend to hold
different perspectives from the average person that are likely to impact
their understanding of reasonable expectations of privacy. In contrast
with the holding of Knotts and other cases that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy for movements in the public view, only 24% of
respondents would find warrantless GPS surveillance of their
movements for more than ten days to be acceptable.132 Most people
also believe they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in both GPS
and CSLI, despite frequent judicial insistence that the emission of such
information is both knowing and voluntary.133 Justice Gorsuch
underlined the divergence of doctrine and popular perception in his
Carpenter dissent, highlighting research that most people distinguish
between invasions of privacy for more serious crimes over more minor
ones, whereas Fourth Amendment doctrine does not.134
In a comprehensive treatment on the subject of knowledge and the
Fourth Amendment, Matthew Tokson documents a number of ways in
which judges tend to overestimate the average person’s understanding
of online privacy and government surveillance.135 While courts have
held that users understand how ISPs operate and how email is sent,
erroneous understandings of the internet ecosystem abound (such as
the 61% of respondents in a Consumer Reports survey who believed
that what they do online is never shared without their permission).136
Courts have used the existence of privacy policies to determine that
users were aware of the privacy interests they gave up, when for a range
of reasons, most users neither read nor understand the privacy
policies.137 In all fairness to judges, rapidly shifting norms regarding
privacy and technology make a reasonable expectation of privacy
difficult for anyone to deduce, as this article has indicated.
Nevertheless, the space between what the reasonable judge expects and
131

See McAllister, supra note 129, at 480, 498 (reporting that 86.1% of respondents did not agree
with the idea that exposing otherwise private information to a third-party provider constituted
knowingly providing that information to law enforcement).
132
Id. at 491.
133
Brief for Empirical Fourth Amendment Scholars in Support of Petitioner, as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 5, Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __ (2018) (No.16-402) (citing a
range of studies reflecting that “more people expect privacy in their cell-site location information
than do not.”) (hereinafter Carpenter Empirical Brief).
134
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , No. 16-402, slip op. at 7-8 (U.S. June 22, 2018)
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Tokson, supra note 13, at 174. See also supra Parts (I) (A) (2) & (3).
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what the reasonable defendant expects undermines the very premise of
the reasonable expectation of privacy test – that it is possible for a judge
to correctly discern societal privacy norms and adjudicate defendants’
Constitutional claims accordingly.
II.

THE ROLE OF CONTEXT

An important thread unifying the flaws in consumer and criminal
privacy governance is widespread failure to sufficiently account for the
role of context in how individuals consider a given privacy scenario.
Context greatly impacts how individuals consider privacy decisions,
from deciding to skip over a privacy policy to sending an incriminating
letter or email. It also changes the value and accuracy of opinion survey
results, depending on whether the survey questions take into account
how differently people think about their privacy under different
circumstances. Privacy decisions tend to be the product of a wide range
of factors, such as the relationship between the discloser and the
recipient, perceived risk of disclosure, the location of the disclosure,
and the information disclosed, as well as the cognitive factors that
might affect a given decision.
The bedrock theory asserting the relationship between context and
privacy is Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity, which
states that the key to effectively evaluating privacy norms and creating
rules that adhere to individual expectations must consider the context
of a given flow of information.138 She defines privacy as the
appropriate flow of personal information, rather than a right to secrecy,
obscurity, or control.139 What is appropriate in a given scenario is
defined as adherence to informational norms, which are measured by
the contextual integrity framework. A privacy event is analyzed on two
levels, normative and descriptive.140 For the descriptive layer, the
privacy scenario is broken down into four basic elements – actors,
contexts, attribute (type of information), and transmission principles.141
If the norm described by the scenario does not conform with
established norms of appropriate information flows, the normative
layer analyzes the change to determine the social and moral impact,
and whether the new norm would better serve the underlying values
and objectives of the social context.142
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See Nissenbaum, supra note 49, at 127.
Id. at 127.
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Id. at 127-28.
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See id. at 150.
139

34

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 35

Contextual integrity builds on a historical and philosophical
acknowledgment that in their day-to-day lives, a person often occupies
multiple roles and exists in different spheres and contexts; no man is a
monolith, and our expectations, decisions, and behavior are shaped by
the particular sphere in which our actions occur.143 By breaking a
privacy decision down to its constitutive elements, it is possible to trace
the individualized factors that impact a given privacy decision, such as
cognitive limitations, the source of the information, or the environment
in which the decision is made. Contextual analysis provides the nuance
that an accurate evaluation of norms demands, rather than the clunky
conjecture presumed by the privacy paradox.144
In consumer privacy law, this could mean evaluating the
contextual factors – such as type of data collected, the identity of the
collector, the reason for collection, the location of the collection – to
consider why the consumer made the choices she made. The context of
privacy decision-making could also be considered more broadly to
encompass not just the circumstances of the decision, but additional
factors, such as the cognitive limitations that shape decision-making
and informational asymmetries. In criminal law, this means both
evaluating the impact of various contextual factors in a given privacy
scenario (the kind of information, the recipient, and so forth), but also
evaluating the impact of the new contextual factors that the use of
technology introduces to old doctrines (for instance, how the real time
dossier of your movements created by a cell phone is distinguishable
from the markings on a physical envelope). What changes about the
circumstances of a privacy action when a transmission of information
is in a written letter, as opposed to an email? Courts would say that
while a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a list of the
people she corresponded with through the mail, the same is not true for
the email addresses, as the emails passed through an Internet service
provider.145 The majority of the population would likely feel
differently.146
Understanding privacy norms within their underlying context is
an enormously important part of interpreting them accurately. Analysis
of a person’s privacy decision-making cannot be mindlessly
143

See id. at 130. See also Schaub et al., supra note 86, at 3-4 (describing the social and historical
predicate for a contextual understanding of privacy).
144
See Martin & Nissenbaum, supra note 48, at 190-92 (noting that contextual integrity requires
that multiple parameters are equally impactful on a given privacy decision).
145
See United States v. Forrester, 512 F. 3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).
146
See Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 21, at 54 (claiming nearly 90% of survey respondents
believed that law enforcement should be prevented from accessing email addresses absent
probable cause).
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extrapolated beyond the circumstances that created it, particularly
when that analysis would shape the development of future law or
trigger the liability of existing ones. Trading your ability to shield your
location from an application may be worth an hour of free WiFi; but
this is a fact-contingent calculation, which must be considered in light
of the factual circumstances that shape it. More accurate research on
privacy norms could enable policymakers to counter the sweeping
assertions based on conjectural tautology with a more systematized
approach, based on empirical evidence of the contextual expectations
and preferences that privacy critics so often purport to be able to divine.
III.

EMPIRICAL PRIVACY RESEARCH

To better understand privacy norms, judges and policymakers
need to understand the inherent limitations impacting privacy decisionmaking, and to examine the context surrounding those choices at a
more granular level than they currently do. Empirical research already
informs consumer privacy policymaking, but different forms of
research that address the role of context, considers the cognitive and
practical limitations of privacy decision-making, and differentiates
among privacy preferences, expectations, and behavior will provide
more accurate insights for policymakers than opinion surveys that
ignore the impact of context on how individuals consider privacy
decisions, or assume the existence of a perfectly informed,
economically rational decision-maker. Empirical research that attempts
to account for the flaws in how we currently measure privacy norms in
law and policy, such as cognitive limitations and information
asymmetries, can guide judges and policymakers in their application of
current law and shape the development of better ones in the future. In
some cases, empirical research may assist consumers in making
privacy choices that adhere to their expectations, such as through
managing the volume of decisions or the way privacy policies are
worded. A more granular analysis of privacy decision-making can help
explain the divergence between stated privacy preferences and privacy
behavior that blunter standards fail to grasp. Careful, detailed analysis
can serve as a critical counterpoint to the facile argument that the
contradictions between privacy preference and observed behavior
compel the conclusion that the preference is meaningless, or a
deliberate repudiation of the preference.
Much of the new research exploring these ideas relies on various
artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, such as the use of machine
learning to create a predictive model of privacy norms or guiding a
user’s choices according to their previous ones. General AI, the hazy
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finish line of omnipotent, human-level cognition that has driven the
research field for decades, is an unknown distance from current
capabilities – an omniscient Skynet that can seamlessly manage our
privacy concerns for us remains the stuff of science fiction.147 But
narrow AI, autonomous or semi-autonomous processes that can
complete tasks within a certain scope, such as image or voice
recognition, has been steadily and rapidly improving, and has the
potential to help coalesce blunt privacy standards with the realities of
multi-dimensional privacy decision-making.148 Various types of AI are
differentiated by the type of logic they employ to accomplish a given
task.149 Machine learning algorithms improve through iteration on a set
of training data, and then based on the connections between features in
the data, designate their own rules for classifying a given input.150
Natural language processing refers to a host of machine-learning
techniques that interpret text using statistical inference or the use of
neural networks, which are inspired by the knowledge trajectory
framework of the human neural system.151 While not generally
considered a form of artificial intelligence, another technique that has
been often used in tandem with AI-focused privacy research is
crowdsourcing, which uses human expertise, such as crowd-workers
answering survey questions or labeling training data, to expand what
automated processes can accomplish.152 Current examples include
Wikipedia, which is driven by the information provided by human
147

STAN. U., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030 at 4-5 (2016), https://perma.cc/8ZS2SP47 (hereinafter, Stanford Report).
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ALEX CAMPOLO, MADELYN SANFILIPPO, MEREDITH WHITTAKER & KATE CRAWFORD, AI
NOW 2017 REPORT 3 (2017), https://perma.cc/96MM-2K9R (“[R]eal-world applications [of AI]
have only accelerated in the last decade due to … better algorithms, increases in networked
computing power and the tech industry’s ability to capture and store massive amounts of data.”).
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See generally id. (including neural networks, Naïve Bayes classifiers, decision trees, and
logistic regression).
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See Stan. U., Machine Learning, COURSERA, https://perma.cc/XNG7-G2VS (last visited Sep.
12, 2018) (“Machine learning is the science of getting computers to act without being explicitly
programmed.”); Nikki Castle, An Introduction to Machine Learning Algorithms, DATA SCIENCE
(June 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/BQ2K-2EPG (explaining machine learning and providing an
overview of random forests, neural networks, logistic regression, and kernel methods.); Jenna
Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks”: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms,
BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2016, at 5.
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See generally Peng Lai Li, Natural Language Processing, 1 GEO. TECH. L. REV. 98 (2016);
YOAV GOLDBERG, NEURAL NETWORK METHODS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING at xvii
(2017) (“Natural language processing (NLP) is a collective term referring to automatic
computational processing of human languages. This includes both algorithms that take humanproduced text as input, and algorithms that produce natural looking text as outputs.”); Stanford
Report, supra note 147, at 14.
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Cf. Stanford Report, supra note 147, at 9 (defining crowdsourcing as a form of artificial
intelligence that “investigates methods to augment computer systems by making automated calls
to human expertise to solve problems that computers alone cannot solve well”).
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editors, or the Amazon Mechanical Turk system, which provides
access to human participants for a given task (such as answering survey
questions) in exchange for a small fee.153 Crowdsourcing provides a
relatively rich and inexpensive source of data to populate the training
sets computer scientists can then use to train predictive models.
The value of this new empirical privacy research is that it can
provide a more accurate basis for privacy law and policy by explaining
why people make the privacy decisions they make, after taking into
account decision-making flaws, the impact of context, and the
distinctions between preferences, expectations, and behavior. While
opinion surveys have been a common tool of privacy law and policy,
they often fail to capture a complete picture, fueling anti-privacy
narratives like the privacy paradox’s conclusion that anti-privacy
actions must speak louder than pro-privacy words. For example, in a
recent paper, Helen Nissenbaum and Kirsten Martin dissect the
methodology of privacy opinion surveys, and demonstrate how the fact
that individuals modulate their privacy behavior to contextual factors
contradicts previous results that fueled the narrative of the privacy
paradox.154 But research that designs around the flaws of past
methodologies may be able to eclipse those failures, such as more
granular opinion surveys, or methodologies that measure behavior
directly. In addition, crowdsourcing can be used to facilitate broader
opinion surveys. When trying to ascertain a descriptive understanding
of existing norms – for example, whether most people on average
would assume that they have an expectation of privacy in their cell site
location information – opinion surveys are still enormously valuable,
and crowdsourcing may assist in expanding their reach, particularly as
response rates for traditional landline phone surveys continue to
plummet, impacting the quality of the available data.155 Surveys are not
inherently flawed as a methodology, provided they do not rely on the
153

See Stanford Report, supra note 147, at 16. See also James Vincent, Mozilla Is Crowdsourcing
Voice Recognition to Make AI Work for the People, VERGE (July 7, 2017, 10:17 AM EDT),
https://perma.cc/78JC-YC9E.
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Martin & Nissenbaum, supra note 48, at 180-81 (“[A] nuanced view of privacy is able to
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judgments about specific information-sharing situations, these judgments are quite nuanced.”).
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See Ben Casselman, Are Wage Gains Picking Up? Stalling? Questionable Data Makes It Hard
to Say, N.Y.T. (March 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/business/economy/wagedata.html (noting that “Americans are increasingly refusing to respond to government surveys”
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same misplaced assumptions about privacy that have characterized
previous ones, such as conflating preferences and expectations,
assuming the respondent is deeply informed about the internet
ecosystem, or divorcing broad privacy value statements from
situational context. Instead, these new methods acknowledge the limits
of asking someone broad questions about how they value their privacy
writ large. They also design around the prior flaws of previous survey
methods by focusing on the context of privacy decisions and parsing
the kinds of decisions being made in a given scenario (whether a true
preference, a resigned expectation, or an action impacted by lack of
information or decision fatigue).
I have divided the current research into descriptive research, the
primary objective of which is to provide accurate information on
privacy expectations and norms; and operative tools, which are
designed to spur user privacy behavior that is more consistent with user
expectations. Many of these studies fall into both categories, such as
algorithms that model user preferences in order to provide an operative
tool,156 or a project focused on using semi-automation to streamline
reading privacy policies, which intends to observe trends in common
mismatches between policy commitments and user expectations.157
The taxonomy is for simplicity.
A. Descriptive Research
Descriptive empirical privacy research – research that uses a
range of methods to isolate the factors that impact individual privacy
preferences and expectations, as well as illustrating broader norms –
could be enormously helpful for policymakers and judges as they
attempt to better understand the inconsistencies and ambiguities of
modern privacy behavior and beliefs.
In a recent paper, a group of researchers from New York
University and Princeton University used crowdsourcing and other
methods to automate the discovery of privacy norms.158 The
researchers used Helen Nissenbaum’s five-element contextual integrity
framework – sender, subject, attribute, recipient, transmission principle
– to capture norms that applied to variations of scenarios in an
educational setting.159 They automatically generated 1,411 questions
156
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using the framework, where a given question might be the following:
“Is it acceptable for the Professor (sender) to share the student
(subject)’s grades (attribute) with the class (recipient) with the
student’s permission (transmission principle)?”160 The participants
could respond with “yes,” “no,” or “does not make sense” (to remove
the automatically generated scenarios that would be unlikely to occur
in the real world, such as a student sending a teacher a TA’s grades).161
The researchers developed three metrics to gauge how the survey group
perceived a given question; a norm-approval score, a use-approval
score, and a divergence score.162 The first score measures whether a
norm was approved by the respondents, such as a 50% or 66% overall
approval score. The second measures how many norms were approved
by a given respondent, and the third measures the variance of one
respondent’s answers from the answers of all the others – i.e., their
dissatisfaction with the established norm.163 The researchers then
encoded the privacy norms established by the respondents’ answers
into formal logic and used automated theorem provers to check the
norms for semantic and transitive consistency.164 One widely approved
norm was a professor sending graduate schools a student’s attendance,
with her permission; a widely disapproved norm was a TA sending the
class a student’s grades if the student was performing poorly.165
The researchers were thus able discover population consensus
about a range of privacy interactions, and test the strength, stability,
and consistency of the norms established. They also note that, having
derived a method for encoding norms that reflect broad consensus
about privacy into formal logic, the framework they built could be
amplified through the use of machine learning.166 Namely, having
created the formal framework to capture and express granular privacy
norms in a way that can be used to train a predictive model, that model
could predict additional norms involving different scenarios – such as
included grades, transcript, name, email, level of participation, and photo; and transmission
principles included knowledge, permission, or a triggering event on breach of contract. Id. at 3.
160
Id. at 3.
161
Id. at 3-4.
162
Id. at 4.
163
Id. at 4.
164
A norm had semantic consistency if the information flow that causes a norm to be disapproved
is excluded from the other norms that have been approved. Transitive flow consistency entails
that the property defined by one norm should be present in similar scenarios – a violation of
transitive flow consistency demonstrates a clash between the participant’s expectations and the
logical consequence of that expectation. For example, a participant stating that she never shares
electronic information with strangers, and subsequently stating that she uses email would violate
transitive flow consistency. Id. at 7.
165
Id. at 6 tbl.2.
166
Id. at 2.
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what consumers think about a particular type of tracking an agency is
considering regulating, or how people distinguish among different
kinds of sensitive information that are sent through a third-party service
provider.
Another study at the University of California, Irvine built on
similar ideas. The researchers built a machine-learning model to
predict participants’ future privacy preferences based on participants’
reactions to various privacy scenarios in real time involving a
connected device.167 The researchers developed an app for Google
Glass where the glasses would display a given IoT scenario based on
the participant’s location, and he or she would then respond to
corresponding survey questions about their preferred privacy outcomes
in the app. Similar to the contextual integrity framework, the questions
broke down a privacy interaction into contextual parameters – where
the monitoring occurs, what is monitored, who is monitoring, why the
monitoring is taking place, and the frequency of the monitoring. They
also asked about participants’ desire to be notified, their willingness to
accept the monitoring, and their level of comfort, associated risk, and
appropriateness of the monitoring involved.168 Having the participants
answer questions at the locations they were being asked to evaluate
through projecting the scenarios onto Google Glass has the added value
of giving participants a more realistic and less abstract reminder of how
they might truly react to each scenario in the real world.
Results included a range of preferences, such as the fact that
participants would not allow videotaping of their movements without
a clear purpose, and that they found still photography to be relatively
more acceptable, but were still concerned about still photography with
a purpose if the purpose is to determine a specific characteristic.169
Monitoring for safety or social reasons (such as a service
recommending a friend) was considered invasive, whereas monitoring
for health purposes was more likely to be deemed acceptable.170 The
researchers then used a clustering algorithm to determine the impact of
the different contextual factors (such as location, basis for monitoring,
and so forth), and trained a machine learning classifier on the survey
responses to predict user privacy preferences based on context (where,
what, who, the reason for monitoring, and the persistence thereof).171
The model was 77% accurate in predicting a binary privacy decision
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(simply accepting the monitoring or rejecting it), and the researchers’
use of an interpretable method of machine learning meant that they
could determine why the model made the decisions it did.172
Another study also examined privacy preference modeling for
IoT. The researchers used crowdsourcing to show participants contextbased privacy vignettes design to measure the impact of eight factors
on privacy decisions – type of data collected, the location where the
data was collected, whether the user benefits from the data collection,
the device that collects the data, the purpose of collection, retention
time, whether the data is shared, and whether additional information
could be inferred.173 After being shown the vignette, participants were
asked them how often they would want their phones to notify them
about that type of collection, how comfortable they were with that data
collection, and whether they would allow or deny the collection.174 The
researchers then used statistical regression to determine the
significance of various factors, and used the data to train two machinelearning models, one to predict the individual’s comfort level with a
particular data collection scenario, and the other to predict what the
individual’s ultimate decision to allow or deny data collection would
be.175 The researchers were thus able to analyze which factors were the
most influential for both comfort level and ultimate data collection
decision.176 As comfort level and collection decision were separate
prediction models, the researchers could parse when comfort level and
desire to permit or deny collection were distinct, and found that a high
comfort level for a given collection scenario did not always mean that
the user would choose to have their data collected in that scenario, if
given the choice.177 The study also found that users were more likely
to accept collection when their data was being put to “beneficial” use,
either for their own personal benefit, or for the “greater good.”178 The
collection decision and comfort level models were 76-80%179 and 81%
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accurate, respectively.180 These results are helpful for separating the
factors and result of privacy decision-making that are often assumed,
as well as illuminating which ones are more important than others.
B. Operative Research
Other researchers have focused on using different artificial
intelligence techniques to guide user behavior in a more privacyprotective way, such as through providing the information necessary
for coherent privacy decision-making in a more understandable form,
or by mitigating the effects of decision fatigue and other cognitive
phenomena. This includes different approaches to streamlining the
process of reading privacy policies, and modeling user preferences to
build predictive algorithms that nudge the user’s privacy decisions
accordingly.
One group investing considerable efforts towards researching and
building privacy-protective user tools is the Useable Privacy Project,
an ongoing research collaboration at Carnegie Mellon University.181
One aspect of their work focuses on developing techniques using
natural language processing, crowdsourcing, and machine learning to
automate (or semi-automate) the process of reading a privacy policy,
in order to provide users with better information, mitigate the cognitive
biases that hinder privacy decision-making, and build a database of
privacy policy trends to illustrate where expectation mismatches are
most prevalent, what common policy clauses are the most misleading
for readers, and other impediments to coherent privacy decisionmaking.182 In one study, the researchers examined the mismatch
between users’ privacy expectations online, and what the privacy
policy of a given website actually permitted the company to do.183 The
180
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researchers similarly found that a range of highly contextual factors
impacted what participants’ expectations were and why, including
website type (health, financial, or dictionary) and user characteristics –
things like privacy knowledge, privacy concept familiarity, age,
whether or not the participant had an account with the website, or had
used it recently.184 Isolating the instances where privacy policies are
the most likely to contravene privacy expectations could be
enormously helpful in reducing decision fatigue in users, by
highlighting only the portions of a given policy that they will need to
read.185
In another study, another group of researchers built a classifier to
automatically locate provisions of choice in privacy policies, such as
the ability of the user to opt out of collection by clicking on a URL in
the policy.186 As opting out is a concrete, effective action the user can
take, it is one of the more significant aspects to tease from a dense
privacy policy and bring to the user’s attention.187 Highlighting the
most important aspects of privacy decision-making for users, such as
when they can opt out, prevents them from sapping their mental energy
on cognitive tasks that are less important for their privacy choices, such
as reading an entire privacy policy when actually reading it is unlikely
to sway the user’s decision to use the service. The ultimate goal would
be to create a browser plug-in that would identify opt-out hyperlinks to
the user.188 The researchers also relied on manual annotation of privacy
policies to build logic representations for future automation, and
crowdsourced annotations to train a machine-learning classifier to
identify when a policy would be clear to human users.189 Another
project, Polisis, uses natural language processing and neural-network
classifiers to power a browser plug-in that breaks down the privacy
policy of a given website for the user.190
In yet another study, researchers at the University of California,
Berkeley used machine learning to predict how a user would respond
to a privacy decision – namely, an application permission request – to
predict their response to another privacy decision.191 The researchers
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184
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Hamza Harkous, Kassem Fawaz, Rémi Lebret, Florian Schaub, Kang G. Shin & Karl Aberer,
Polisis: Automated Analysis and Presentation of Privacy Policies Using Deep Learning, 2018
SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 531, 531-32.
191
Primal Wijesekera, Arjun Baokar, Lynn Tsai, Joel Reardon, Serge Egelman, David Wagner &

44

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 35

first measured the difference in accuracy of the user’s decision,
(whether the permission granted or denied corresponded with the user’s
expressed preference, when compared with what the privacy policy
accomplishes) when users were given the permissions decision on first
using the app, rather than on first installing it.192 The idea here was that
an ask-on-first-use permission would be made when the user had
greater context for the decision, rather than at the moment the user
downloaded the app.193 The hypothesis appeared correct, as the ask-onfirst-use decisions were 84% accurate, while the ask-on-first-install
decisions were 25% accurate.194 They then built a classifier that
incorporates passively observed information relating to the individual’s
privacy preferences (behavioral information, responses to runtime
information, and responses to permissions requests195), and reports the
prediction and a confidence score, which would determine whether or
not the user was prompted to confirm the preference selected by the
algorithm.196 The researchers’ goal was to eliminate the volume of
decisions a user has to make in addition to aligning the decisions more
closely with the user’s stated preferences.197 By using past decision
history and other information, the algorithm could infer when the
privacy decision was aberrant from decisions the person made in the
past, and automatically make the decisions where the algorithm
reported a high confidence in its prediction.198 This prevents the user
from being overwhelmed with low-impact choices she is unlikely to
care about, while preventing her lack of information from skewing the
choice she made, and still giving her the opportunity to make the harder
choices that she would want to make herself.
In a similar experiment, researchers tested an Android
permissions manager, Turtleguard, which balanced the dual objectives
of grounding each privacy decision in context and while preventing the
user from being overwhelmed by the volume of decisions she needs to

Konstantin Beznosov, The Feasibility of Dynamically Granted Permissions: Aligning Mobile
Privacy with User Preferences, 2017 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS SYMP. ON
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192
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options.
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make.199 Turtleguard uses a classifier to respond to the permissions
request based on whether the requesting application was actually being
used at the time of the request, which the researchers found was a
reliable indicator of whether participants thought a permission request
was invasive or not.200 These decisions are logged in the Turtleguard
portal, and can be audited by the user to calibrate the classifier for
future requests. Another study trained a classifier to discern when a
user would be comfortable being tracked by an advertiser, based on the
properties of the web page, the user’s demographics, and attitude
towards tracking.201 While this study was preliminary and on a smaller
scale, it demonstrates another area in which users display finelygrained, contextual reasons for the privacy decisions they make, and
that those reasons can be inferred and used by an algorithm to finesse
privacy decision-making.
Together, these studies point to the possibility of using empirical
methods to gain new insights into privacy preferences, expectations,
behaviors, and norms, and the factors that influence each. Modeling
crowdsourced norms, like the studies using contextual integrity
vignettes202 or the research on IoT preference modeling,203 can be
enormously helpful in eliciting why people make the privacy decisions
they do. Contextual modeling could be used as a baseline to map the
average reasonable person’s expectation of privacy in a range of
scenarios, particularly in cases of emerging technology where judges
or regulators have a limited basis of comparison. With machine
learning, studies that prioritize explainable methods – such as the study
that used clustering to identify important factors on participants’
privacy perceptions,204 or the study that isolated comfort level and
desire to permit tracking205 – can help illustrate for regulators what
kinds of practices users generally consider deceptive or unfair.206
Proactive tools, like semi-automated privacy policy annotations and
nudging privacy assistants, can help counteract problems like
information asymmetry and decision fatigue, and empower users to
make coherent privacy decisions that suit their expectations. In turn,
tools that better enable individuals to make privacy choices that reflect
their preferences will ideally help researchers and regulators to more
199
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accurately infer privacy preference preferences and expectations from
their privacy behavior. An ideal world isn’t the one in which we happen
to live, but absent an overhaul of the entire notice and choice system,
creative tools that help counteract the flaws of the user control model
can at least help users in their seemingly impossible quest to obtain
effective notice and meaningful choice. The following section will
detail how both operative and descriptive research can be implemented
and incentivized in the development and application of privacy law.
IV.

APPLICATIONS

The value of empirical research in privacy law and policymaking
would, appropriately enough, depend on the context in which it is used.
Courts, regulatory agencies, and legislatures have different legal,
practical, and philosophical limitations on the kinds of evidence that
they can rely on as the basis for decision-making. Due to the different
roles and histories of these institutions, policymakers’ reactions to the
value of empirical research will depend on their role, and consequently,
so will the viability of these proposals.207 The following section will
discuss the value of different types of empirical privacy research for
different areas of privacy law and policy.
A. Descriptive Research & Fourth Amendment
Modeling crowdsourced norms could provide a more accurate and
empirical counterpoint to the privacy expectations that judges attempt
to approximate, as well as demonstrate the instances when the
implications of new technology diverge sharply enough from the
logical underpinnings of precedent to merit a new approach. Many
scholars have called for judges to anchor their legally determinative
assessments of societal facts in empiricism, particularly in Fourth
Amendment cases.208 In one of the earliest such appeals, Christopher
Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher conducted a survey of 217 people to
determine how the average person actually perceives encounters that
207

See J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions Following
Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 155, 156 (1991) (detailing the
literature arguing that the impact of empirical research on public policy decision-making depends
on the particular institutional role of the policymaker).
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See, e.g., Carpenter Empirical Brief, supra note 133, at 1-2 (arguing that empirical evidence
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expectations as reported by judges and precedent, and the privacy expectations reported in the
survey results). See generally Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in
Criminal Law and Procedure – And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 852-53 (“That
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implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy, and ultimately
discovered a wide range of situations where the doctrine reflected
assumptions contrary to the norms participants reported, particularly a
lower expectation of privacy in a range of scenarios.209 Lior Strahilevitz
has advocated for the reasonable expectation of privacy in tort cases to
consider an empirical evaluation of how information travels through
social networks, ideally providing a sense of how likely certain
information was to be made public based on the structure of the
network and cultural variables.210 Paul Ohm proposed that equilibrium
adjustment theory be anchored in statistical measurements of how
technology has shifted the balance between observer and observed,
such as through the length of investigations, or number of
indictments.211 Andrew Ferguson has observed that location-based
predictive policing algorithms could produce empirical data on what
makes an area “high-crime” for Fourth Amendment purposes, possibly
reducing the ability of the capacious term to be used as a stand-in for
disadvantaged or minority neighborhoods.212 Perhaps the most relevant
to the present analysis is Matthew Tokson’s empirical examination of
the role of knowledge in the reasonable expectation of privacy test, in
which he argues that anchoring the test to individual or societal
knowledge fundamentally prevents the Fourth Amendment from
evolving in step with technology.213 Empirical research on the kinds of
throwaway assumptions that often guide a judge’s decision in a Fourth
Amendment case – such as how common a certain kind of search is, or
under what circumstances most people would feel able to terminate an
encounter with the police – could play an enormous role in anchoring
amorphous, norm-based questions to facts, a crucial development when
radical technological developments make those norms difficult to
gauge, and quick to shift.
Empirical research can also be used to render the fuzzy judicial
approximations of privacy more accurate, as most judges are limited in
their understanding of what the expectations of the “average” person
are.214 Generalized assumptions that judges may hold about societal
209

Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 11, at 732, 733-35 (describing hypothesis and sample
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See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CH. L. REV. 919, 97071 (2005).
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norms are narrowed by the range of experiences they themselves have
held, which typically do not reflect the experience of the defendants
before them.215 To give a recent example, in the oral arguments for
Carpenter v. United States, Justice Kennedy inquired as to how well
the average individual knows what the retention and access policies of
a cell service provider are, joking that “if I know [that a cell phone
company has my data], everyone does.”216 The Justice was attempting
to poke fun at himself by indicating that if someone as technologically
unsavvy as himself is aware of cell phone company practices, the rest
of the population must be. But in reality, the converse is more often
true; a judge’s experience is, unsurprisingly, more often a higher bar
than that of the average person. The judiciary is older, more urban,
better-educated and wealthier than most of the population,217 and this
demographic skew likely has a correspondingly transformative effect
on how judges conceptualize what “reasonable” is, as they are more
likely to be aware of surveillance practices than defendants, and
unlikely to recognize that their perspective is unrepresentative.218
Indeed, Tokson’s study found that the majority of cell phone users do
not know that their location is being tracked and collected, and 15%
believed that no collection occurs at all.219

framework” for evaluating privacy norms in tort cases); Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 21, at
49 (describing the results of previous, similar studies and opinion polls reflecting that “the public
has higher expectations of privacy than those recognized by the courts in most Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence”); Jonathan Simon, Katz at Forty: A Sociological Jurisprudence Whose Time Has
Come, 41 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 935, 948 (2008) (arguing that the lack of substantive guidance
shaping how a reasonable expectation of privacy creates “an invitation to judicial ‘selfindulgence’ in declaring what society is in fact prepared to recognize as reasonable.”) (citing
Richard Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV.
173, 187); McAllister, supra note 129, at 31 (arguing that empirical evidence is a better indicator
of societal expectations of privacy, and rather than reasoning by often-inapt analogy, courts
should simply “ask society”).
215
See generally David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PENN. L. REV., 541, 545 (noting
that “[h]istorically, most constitutional fact-finding depended on the Justices' best guess about the
matter,” such as Chief Justice Marshall’s observation in Gibbons v. Ogden that "[a]ll America
understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation")
(citations omitted); Erik Luna, The Katz Jury, 41 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 839, 846-7, 849 (2008)
(arguing that “[the Court’s] decisions on Fourth Amendment applicability do not seem to comport
with the expectations of privacy held by the common citizen”).
216
Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Carpenter, 585 U.S. ___ (No. 16-402) (2018)
217
See Chao et al., supra note 13, at 290.
218
See Carpenter Empirical Brief, supra note 133, at 11-12 (noting the statistical relationship
between age and receptiveness to the third-party doctrine); Tokson, supra note 13, at 166 (noting
that judges are likely to attribute their level of knowledge to defendants, given the tendency of
individuals generally to impute their level of knowledge on a subject to others); id. at 169-171
(discussing the uneven distribution of knowledge).
219
Tokson, supra note 13, at 177.
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Analyzing his 810-person survey on individuals’ understanding
of cell phone tracking, Tokson notes that the average person’s
knowledge of cell phone tracking is substantially less than what judges
have ruled it is, and the average person’s expectation of privacy in that
information is higher.220 Analyzing the results against past judicial
holdings on societal expectations of privacy, he further concluded that
while judges are frequently correct in ruling on the doctrinal perception
of privacy norms, they tend to underestimate what most people actually
expect, and overestimate what they actually know.221 Judges have no
problem applying the standards the way the law instructs; but the law
relies on the idea that the judge’s perception of a reasonable
expectation of privacy is fungible with that of the average defendant,
which is rarely the case. Another study also found that that community
consensus on privacy expectations frequently diverged starkly from
Supreme Court precedent.222
A judge’s bias about a given defendant’s role in society may also
skew outcomes. Avani Mehta Sood has noted that motivated cognition,
the unconscious human tendency to reason towards preferred
outcomes, may affect judicial applications of the exclusionary rule in
Fourth Amendment cases.223 For example, he found that while in an
experiment using lay participants the severity of the crime decreased
the likelihood that the participants would allow the information to be
suppressed.224 In testing that hypothesis on judges themselves, he also
discovered that some may be conscious of motivated cognition and
attempt to mitigate to its effects, while others are simply susceptible to
the phenomenon.225 Using a contextual framework to model
informational norms can provide judges with a source of accurate data
beyond their own experience for what norms are widely accepted by
society, rather than what norms are widely accepted by judges.
In addition to providing judges with a more accurate perception
of what the average reasonable expectation of privacy actually is,
context-based modeling can also balance Fourth Amendment values in
a way that is faithful to the principles of the precedent, while
accounting for the decisive impact of new technology. Andrew Selbst
220
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has argued for a contextual-integrity-based approach to Fourth
Amendment doctrine, arguing that Nissenbaum’s theory of appropriate
information flows is better-equipped to respond to the shifting,
granular privacy expectations of the modern reasonable person in the
digital age.226 While this article does not go quite so far as to propose
replacing Fourth Amendment analysis with contextual integrity
altogether, Selbst’s prescient proposal demonstrates the value of
contextual integrity to a Fourth Amendment inquiry, as well as the role
that context-based modeling could play in making blunt legal tests
coalesce with the realities of technological norms. Nissenbaum herself
has also applied the contextual integrity framework to the Fourth
Amendment context, arguing that the Fourth Amendment doctrines
concerning metadata – namely, the content/non-content distinction, the
public view doctrine, and the third-party doctrine – violate contextual
integrity because technology has disrupted the original information
flow in a way that is normatively undesirable.227
Crucially, context-based models like contextual integrity are
deliberately flexible enough to capture the full range of interests that
the Fourth Amendment is intended to measure, beyond merely the
weight of the privacy expectation being assessed and whether that
expectation would be deemed valid by society.228 The range of
scenarios can capture the full spectrum of interests that Fourth
Amendment tests are intended to balance, including when warrantless
search or seizure implicates a lesser privacy interest (such as consent
searches,229 or evidence in plain view230), or where the governmental
prerogative is greater (such as search incident to arrest,231 national
security,232 or heightened danger233) while still providing a more
accurate report of what privacy expectations are reasonable.
Carpenter demonstrates how valuable contextual modeling could
be to help judges assess nuanced privacy norms, particularly as the
chasm between the limits of what Fourth Amendment principles
purport to protect and what the doctrine actually covers is continually
226
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widened by technological change.234 The Court held that the collection
of more than seven days’ worth of CSLI by the government without a
probable-cause warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, given the
revealing nature of the information.235 The majority “declined to
extend” Smith and Miller to CSLI, while leaving the third party
doctrine untouched, if marked for death, as it pertains to any other
information beyond the seven-days’ worth of CSLI at issue in
Carpenter.236 But determining exactly how different types of
information that seem to implicate the same kinds of privacy concerns
as CSLI should be considered will be a difficult and fact-intensive task
for judges. As Justice Kennedy raised in his dissent, the majority’s
basis for requiring a warrant does not provide much clarity as to what
distinguishes the sensitivity of CSLI from financial information held
by digital intermediaries, for one example.237 Chief Justice Roberts
claimed that however it is that the Court must assess what constitutes a
reasonable expectation of privacy, its lodestars of seeking to secure
“the privacies of life” against “arbitrary power” and “plac[ing]
obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance”238 must
mean that the Constitution requires the government to obtain a warrant
before it can access “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”
geolocation information.239
But how will judges distinguish which other information passed
through a third party (that is, any information transmitted over the
internet or through any kind of digital service provider) provides the
“intimate window into a person’s life” that the majority held CSLI
specifically provides?240 Fitbit data that shows a person’s sleep cycle
or sexual habits, transactions on a financial app like Venmo, the times
of day that a person adjusts the smart thermostat in their bedroom –
each of these could implicate the “familial, political, professional,

Or as Paul Ohm observed, “What might have seemed like a slow and partial degradation of the
Fourth Amendment appears instead to be a full evisceration.” See Ohm, supra note 211, at 1311.
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Broad Reach Of Carpenter v. United States, JUST SECURITY, (June 27, 2018),
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compulsory process.”); id. at 18 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The troves of intimate information
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religious, and sexual”241 associations that the majority felt warranted
protection for CSLI but is not directly tied to geolocation, and thus
excluded from Carpenter’s new warrant requirement. The ability of the
government to obtain information about a suspect in hindsight as
opposed to the need to surveil prospectively is the same for this kind of
non-geolocational data, and it is similarly cheap for companies or law
enforcement to gather and store.242 It is exactly here that contextual
modeling could be useful to help judges identify which kinds of
information presents particularly sensitive privacy concerns for the
average person. Variations of different scenarios could be modeled just
as the researchers modeled education privacy vignettes in the NYU and
Princeton study.243 While Chief Justice Roberts describes the case as
deciding “only that a warrant is required in the rare case where the
suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third
party,”244 given how much information passes through third parties by
default and how much of that information can implicate the legitimate
interests that the Chief Justice himself cites, distinguishing when
individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy will be a
difficult, finnicky task. Context-based modeling could be invaluable in
capturing the privacy norms that have left the assumptions of Fourth
Amendment doctrine far behind, and which judges can struggle to
discern.245
Descriptive research on privacy norms can also impact how
searches and seizures are conducted before a case is even brought. The
Office of Legal Policy in the Department of Justice issues guidance to
federal law enforcement and component prosecutors about its policy
views on certain matters, such as whether there are sensible reasons not
to pursue enforcement in certain areas, or only under certain
conditions.246 For example, the Department issued guidance in 2015 on
the use of cell site simulators, directing federal agents to acquire a
warrant before a simulator is used, despite the fact that existing
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precedent did not clearly require them to do so.247 The Attorney
General releases memoranda to United States attorneys recommending
approaches and prosecutorial tools, and the office also testifies to
Congress on its recommendations.248 Empirical research on privacy
norms could inform such recommendations, and have a far-reaching
impact on how searches and seizures are conducted—and defended—
on the ground, impacting cases before they reach the courtroom, or
preventing them from being filed at all.
Of course, the use of empirical modeling would never determine
what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in lieu of a judge.
Even if legal or practicable, such a solution would require a blithe faith
in the perfectibility of technology that past mistakes have repeatedly
proven to be misguided. But using contextual modeling to examine
areas where the juxtaposition of new technology with analog precedent
has made the average reasonable expectation of privacy difficult to
discern can lend some basis of empirical accuracy to broad judicial
assessments of protean technological norms. While the Supreme Court
is typically loath to overturn precedent, they have been known to do so
when technology distorts the applicability of existing precedent to a
sufficient extent.249 It is also important to acknowledge the uphill battle
that proposals to incorporate empirical approaches to judicial decisionmaking often face. Judges are typically leery to rely on “legislative
facts,” or factual determinations that are the product of the real world
and may inform the legal determinations in a case.250 This is often for
247
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good reason, as without sufficient support from fact-finding entities or
unbiased experts, they may rely on those facts to their detriment, and
to the detriment of the development of precedent based on accurate
conclusions.251 Some judges seem even more leery to rely on legislative
facts resulting from social science in particular.252 However, the broad
distrust of fact formed outside of the record is necessarily limiting.
Judges cannot be expected to be a one-stop shop for all given
information, particularly in cases involving complex technologies.253
Others have further noted that reliance on empirical evidence has
previously played a key role in Fourth Amendment and other cases,
and that both members of the Supreme Court and lower courts have
acknowledged its potential.254
It should also be noted that the value of using contextual modeling
to discern what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy depends
on the rule governing how that question should be evaluated⎯a rule
that the Supreme Court has yet to categorically provide.255 While an indepth treatment of the issue is outside the scope of this article, it does
assume that a judge’s understanding of what the average person
See Ryan Gabrielson, It’s a Fact: Supreme Court Errors Aren’t Hard to Find, PROPUBLICA,
(Oct. 17, 2017) https://perma.cc/7BSH-KQU4.
252
See Luna, supra note 215 at 848-49 (noting that “[t]he Court has shown no inclination to take
a more empirically grounded approach to the preliminary question of search and seizure analysis”)
(citing Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 11, at 761); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, ASA President
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva Responds to Chief Justice John Roberts, AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N
(October 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y9UV-SXVD
(responding to Justice Roberts’
characterization of social science data as “sociological gobbledygook,” noting examples of how
sociological research has contributed to key legal and policy revelations, such as “clear evidence
that separate is not equal . . . modern public opinion polling . . . [and] evidence of gender
discrimination in the workplace”). But see Simon, supra note 214, at 937-38 (discussing the
backlash to the sociological basis for Brown v. Board of Education, and arguing for the value, and
possibility of, a sociological approach to the Fourth Amendment).
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general subject-matter courts are compelled to decide and proposing solutions to bridge that gap
of expertise).
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believes a reasonable expectation of privacy to be is relevant to how
the test should be implemented. Under that assumption, the more
accurate a judge’s understanding of the average person’s expectations
is, the more likely future Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will avoid
decisions that make sense to esteemed legal scholars, but contravene
the expectations of the majority of the population, upon which the
doctrine purports to depend.
B. Descriptive Research & Consumer Privacy
The idea that empirically-driven determinations can spur better
policymaking and regulation is also not a new concept in consumer
privacy law, or in regulation more generally. For example, the
Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking was established by a
bipartisan law in 2016, and seeks to “develop a strategy for increasing
the availability and use of data in order to build evidence about
government programs.”256 The Commission released a report of its
findings in September of 2017, outlining strategies to improve the way
data is collected at all levels of the government, and used to support
evidence-based decision-making at all levels of authority.257 The report
is remarkably comprehensive in surveying the history of evidencebased policymaking in the federal government, the development of
applicable laws governing government collection and use of data and
statistics, and how evidence-based policymaking is currently
implemented.258 The Commission also emphasized that its
recommendations concerning data collection must necessarily be
accompanied by strong privacy protections and transparency
requirements for the data collected.259 Other recommendations
included recommending that Congress and the President direct federal
departments to develop long-term learning agendas to support the
generation and use of evidence, having the Office of Management and
Budget coordinate evidence-building efforts across departments, and
securing sufficient research for the same.260 Adoption of the
Commission’s recommendations to improve data collection practices
and implement broader use of evidence in policymaking would be an
About CEP, COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING (Jul. 10, 2017),
https://perma.cc/G4HF-TGTT.
257
COMM’N ON EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING: THE PROMISE OF EVIDENCE-BASED
POLICYMAKING 1-3 (2017) (hereinafter Evidence-Based Policymaking Report).
258
See id. at 13-15.
259
Id. at 18 (“A theme that runs throughout this report is that access to confidential data for
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260
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integral part of isolating the lapses in current privacy standards, and
discovering new ways to correct them.
Some laws directly depend on a policymaker’s assessment of
particular privacy norms, for which modeling can provide a more
accurate portrait. For example, the Safety Act requires that motor
vehicle safety standards be ‘practicable,’ which includes that there is
sufficient public acceptance of the technology proposed by the agency
such that wide adoption is possible.261 As vehicles increasingly
incorporate connected features and the development and testing of
automatic vehicles continues to accelerate, vehicle privacy is likely a
relevant consideration to future safety requirements that the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration adopts. The agency noted in its
analysis that quelling public concerns about vehicle privacy and
cybersecurity would be necessary for public acceptance.262
Crowdsourcing and machine learning techniques could provide a more
accurate and nuanced basis for determining what the public will in fact
accept.263
Empirical research on privacy expectations and preferences
already shapes FTC policy guidance and enforcement priorities, and
both a heavier emphasis on its value, and incorporating more effective
forms of research, can better inform those initiatives. The contours of
the FTC’s analysis under its deception authority, the aspect the agency
most broadly relies on in privacy enforcement,264 makes understanding
consumer motivations and norms an important form of inquiry for the
agency. When investigating whether a business practice is deceptive,
the FTC requires that the practice be likely to mislead the consumer,
then analyzes how that practice would be perceived from a consumer
acting reasonably under the circumstances, and whether the conduct in
question was material.265 The first two prongs in particular require FTC
staff to understand how a consumer thinks when she engages in a
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DOT HS 812 014, VEHICLE-TOVEHICLE COMMUNICATIONS: READINESS OF V2V TECHNOLOGY FOR APPLICATION 53 (2014)
(noting that in Pac. Legal Found. v. Dept. of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1345-46 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979), the D.C. Circuit held that public acceptance is one of the criteria for
practicability, one of the factors the agency must demonstrate have met in requiring new safety
standards under the Safety Act); Stephen P. Wood, Jesse Chang, Thomas Healy & John Wood,
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privacy transaction with a company, and whether or not their decisionmaking process is reasonable in light of a range of factors, including
societal norms.266 Using surveys to understand consumer norms is
nothing new for the agency, which already conducts surveys on
consumer attitudes on various topics, using the results to “better
understand how consumers perceive statements or representations
made to them by businesses,” and to help the FTC develop appropriate
policy guidance and enforcement strategies.267
The agency should sharpen its focus on empirical privacy research
and incorporate these new kinds of research that may be more effective
at capturing nuanced privacy norms than opinion surveys alone.
Modeling privacy behavior and norms may be particularly helpful for
informing agency policy guidance, such as which novel practices
consumers might be the most likely to consider invasive.268 Empirical
research on consumer preferences, expectations, and behaviors could
also be invaluable in agency rulemakings, both in terms of providing
substantive information to regulators as they consider how to shape a
new policy, and to populate a robust record to avoid challenges that a
new privacy rule or policy was created on the basis of insufficient
information or demonstration of privacy concern from the public.269
This research can also play an important role in “soft law” policy
guidance, which helps shape industry practice in areas where few
concrete laws may appear to apply with clear certainty, such as with
emerging technology.270 In such guidance, the FTC could report the
results of the privacy norms of the studies it and others conduct on
266
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privacy norms and behavior, and address how the insights gleaned from
them can be incorporated into industry practice.271 In addition to the
cues that FTC guidance provides to industry, it can also shape the
enforcement authorities of state and local consumer agencies, further
facilitating the potential impact of any steps it takes to promote this
kind of research and the use of its findings.272
The FTC is also well-equipped to conduct empirical privacy
research. As the de facto US data protection agency, the Commission
has both the authority and the imperative to share its technical expertise
and insight on specific policy areas with relevant stakeholders,
including industry, consumer advocates, consumers themselves, and
other agencies. Its role in shaping privacy practices will only continue
to grow as a range of industries increasingly involve technology,
particularly as the agencies that have never needed institutional
expertise in privacy find themselves in need of exactly that.273
Empirical research on privacy norms is germane to the FTC’s
institutional role, and can have a decisive impact in shaping privacy
policy as the FTC guides the policymaking of other enforcement
bodies.
The relevant questions of the role empirical research may play in
a policymaker’s decision-making is perhaps the easiest to answer for a
legislative body. In terms of the traditional sense of institutional
parameters, as the branch with the most popular accountability, the
legislature is least constrained in its prerogative to rely on certain kinds
of evidence over others. Congress may overrule court decisions with
which it disagrees, and it has done so, such as with the passage of the
271
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1934 Communications Act in response to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Olmstead,274 or the passage of the Wiretap Act275 in response to
Katz.276 That same accountability makes them subject to public
pressure, particularly when public pressure comes in the form of
special interest groups with a heavy incentive to sway a legislator’s
perception of what the public wants.277 Congress can and should
incentivize further research and remove existing barriers, but the
likelihood that research on privacy norms will impact the position of
any legislator not already predisposed to believe its findings is slim at
best. That said, members of both the House and Senate have shown
interest in the both the benefits and risks of artificial intelligence,278 and
privacy writ large is even more of an established issue on the Hill.279
Reviving Congress’s Office of Technological Assessment could be a
helpful step towards enabling the Hill to tackle nuanced issues of
privacy and technology,280 though it would not in and of itself affect
the underlying incentives and pressures from lobbying that have
prevented the majoritarian branch from legislating stronger privacy
protections,281 giving more resources to the FTC, or any of the other
measures that Congress could accomplish to spur this kind of research.
274
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The technical agencies are ultimately the best positioned to conduct
and incentivize empirical privacy research, and the most likely to be in
a position where their efforts will have any observable effects.
C. Consumer Privacy & Operative Tools
The ideal objective of descriptive research is to provide more
accurate information on privacy expectations, preferences, and norms
to guide the enforcement of current laws, and the development of future
ones. In contrast, operative tools aim to transform user behavior under
the existing rules shaping user behavior, rather than necessarily
transforming the application of current rules. However, tools that guide
how users interact with privacy-invasive technology may have the most
immediate effect on privacy behavior. Tools like browser extensions
that flag aberrant privacy policies, smart privacy assistants, or
permissions managers can accomplish the concrete work of accounting
for notice and choice’s deficiencies, and ideally restore some degree of
meaningful control and choice to the user.
The federal government should support and incentivize this kind
of user-centric privacy research. In some areas, it may be appropriate
for policy to be responsive to the development of user-friendly tools,
such as requiring some degree of uniformity in privacy policies , such
that they can be machine-readable.282 Agencies can lend visibility to
researchers through workshops and conferences, providing grants to
allow these studies to be expanded upon and replicated, or even simply
encouraging the pursuit of such research through outreach.283 During
the Obama administration, the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy established the National Privacy Research Strategy,
which created objectives for federally-funded privacy research, and
provided guidance to agencies on how to further promote privacy
research.284 Even further, the adoption of the proposals made in the
Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission report would spur
research in the private sector, such as adopting a centralized process
through which researchers could apply to receive access to non-public
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government data.285 The spread of proactive tools like permissions
managers and browser extensions can only help improve the ultimate
goal of these efforts: to ensure that users are actually informed about
their privacy choices and that their privacy preferences are actually
respected by the entities collecting and profiting from their
information.
V.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The narrow applications of AI discussed in this paper are
particularly well-suited to the task of improving our understanding of
privacy expectations and norms. Classifiers that can deduce and
incorporate granular contextual data can help illustrate the factors
behind why an individual makes a given privacy decision, and models
that include feedback and auditing mechanisms can adapt as
preferences evolve.286 Natural language processing can be used to
automate analysis of privacy policies,287 demonstrating trends in
widely used provisions and terms that may be hampering the ability of
users to make the decisions that suit their preferences. Non-AI
empirical approaches, such as crowdsourcing, can be used to amplify
these techniques and to deduce consensus on broader informational
norms.288
Not all of the research suggested here requires the use of AI. The
educational privacy contextual modeling study conducted by the NYU
and Princeton researches illustrated that its results could be amplified
by using machine learning to predict additional norms, but the study
simply relied on crowdsourcing to produce the norms themselves.289
Other methods could rely on statistical regression, or other analytical
methods that prioritize comprehension. The focus of this article is on
empirical techniques that can either enhance the value of existing
methods of privacy research (fundamentally, crowdsourcing can be
understood as a different method of conducting an opinion survey), or
support new approaches that will shed light on the discordance between
privacy preferences, expectations, and behavior. Not all of these will
rely on AI, nor will the particular value of a given study necessarily
stem from the use of AI.
285
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It will also be enormously important that the limits of this research
are carefully considered and understood. In extrapolating any
conclusions from quantitative findings, it is crucial to consider what
data was collected and interpreted, but also what data was not. Data is
not found, but made.290 A model that analyzes user behavior within a
certain context may be idiosyncratic to that context. Not all privacy
interests can be quantified or quantified accurately. Beyond the
constraints of what evidence policymakers may legally rely on, and
what various threads of political philosophy dictate that they should
rely on, there are also the factual constraints shaping how AI modeling
can be used. Modeled norms will need to be reliable, replicable, and
representative of the populations they are intended to model.
In the case of individual modeling, researchers should endeavor
to consider how built-in limitations of their experiments might prevent
their results from being fully representative. For instance, one of the
studies measured user behavior on apps that would not lose
functionality if permission settings were denied, so that the researchers
could capture user ideal behavior – preferences, as opposed to either
expectations or resulting tradeoffs.291 Further research and modeling
would have to be careful to distinguish measuring user expectations
from users’ likely response when confronted with a conflict, such as
loss of functionality, and apply the results of their research accordingly.
In each of the studies described, the researchers noted the limits of
population size and skew, and how possible it may be to generalize
their results. Any research conducted should be scrupulously careful to
avoid any bias in sampled groups. Without a careful approach to
ensuring that the data used does in fact reflect a range of demographic
groups, the objective that such a project will seek to accomplish –
providing consumer privacy regulators or judges with a more accurate
understanding of primary norms – will fail and create new systematic
bias in its wake. In the case of crowdsourcing methods, researchers
must be careful to avoid issues of self-selection bias relating to the
population of crowdsourced workers used.292 In particular, Amazon
Mechanical Turk, a crowdsourcing platform used by a wide variety of
researchers including some discussed here, has been subject to a range
of critiques about the population of crowdsourced workers it
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provides.293 Most studies of mobile systems are conducted on non-IOS
systems, which may limit the applications of those findings.294
Different areas of privacy will also present different practical
obstacles for experimental design, such as working with children.
Researchers have applied the contextual integrity framework to
examining how children understand online privacy, but given the legal
and ethical concerns of working with children, the survey responses
were gathered through in-person interviews as opposed to gathering
responses online.295 The FTC noted in a 2018 Privacy Impact
Assessment for FTC Consumer Surveys that the agency does not
normally conduct surveys of children under the age of 13, though if it
did, COPPA would govern the agency’s collection and use of the
information.296 Other contexts may pose similar limitations (or
prohibitions) for using crowdsourcing and other methods. The legal
regime constraining how certain information can be used, such as
health information, will also often restrain research. Any kind of
research that relies on collecting and processing data must also
anticipate how to protect it. Operative tools that collect contextual data
to improve privacy decision-making invite the privacy risks of the very
data it collects, which private researchers must consider in how their
tools are constructed.297 Descriptive research conducted by the
government must also be held to strong standards of privacy protection
of the information gathered and created.298 Fundamentally, proponents
of empirical policy solutions must be carefully attentive that new
techniques do not create new problems as they solve old ones: research
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methodology that produces transparent, reliable results that are capable
of replication is absolutely crucial.
CONCLUSION
A quickly evolving world demands reflective attention to how
legal standards have withstood the pressure of novel threats. In
consumer privacy law, the notice and choice regime rests on the idea
that consumers are empowered to make rational privacy decisions that
will exert control over their information, and that failure to do so is a
rejection of privacy, not a failure of the privacy decision-making
process or of the legal mechanisms designed to protect it. In Fourth
Amendment law, blunt standards like the third-party doctrine and the
content/non-content distinction demonstrate how new contextual
factors created by new technology have changed the principles
undergirding those rules, while judges fail to glean what the average
person’s expectation of privacy actually is. New capacities for
surveillance and artificial intelligence seem to only further erode a
dying structure, making the prognosis all the more grim.
But just as technology may threaten privacy, it may also provide
the capacity to illustrate weaknesses in our current thinking, and
prevent future mistakes. Proactive privacy tools can nudge consumers
into decision-making that better reflects their preferences, and which
will provide a better portrait of what privacy norms really are.
Contextual modeling can provide policymakers with a clearer portrait
of the questions they have struggled to answer since the invention of
the personal computer: why, exactly, do people care about privacy, and
how should that answer shape the privacy protections offered by the
law? Empirical research may not provide that answer definitively
anytime soon, if ever – but it may be able to guide policymakers to
reach estimations that are more accurate than their own conjecture, and
inform the development of more effective and accurate policies around
privacy norms and decision-making.

